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Abstract of the Dissertation 
 Categorization is a vital aspect of human cognition that helps guide learning and 
knowledge. However, when categorization is applied to social categories, it can have 
pernicious downstream effects such as stereotypes and prejudice. By preschool, children 
believe that members of a social category will share inherent, stable characteristics. Thus, 
it is important to understand when the tendency to use social categories to draw 
inferences about other people unfolds in early childhood. I began to address these issues 
in the current dissertation. Specifically, in three projects I examine the origins of social-
group based inferences and how environmental influences shape these inferences across 
early childhood. Project 1 examined the types of characteristics that infants expect 
members of a social group to share. Twenty-month-old infants expected that a single 
individual would be consistent in her social dispositions. Infants did not generalize 
behavioral dispositions across members of a social group. However, additional results 
from Experiment 1 and 2 suggested that infants might have difficulty reasoning about 
social dispositions at this age. Project 2 showed that the manner in which parents discuss 
social groups influences how children learn about social categories and the beliefs that 
children form about social categories. Children that had generic statements read to them 
about a novel social category were more likely to view members of that category as being 
highly similar to one another than children that did not hear the generic statements. 
Project 3 demonstrated the relative salience of social categories in the environment, a 
more distal environmental influence, impacts the social categories that children attend to 
when making inductive inferences. Together, these studies shed light on the origins of 
social-group based inferences in infancy, and how the environment impacts these 
inferences across early childhood. 
  1 
Chapter 1 
 
Categorization is vital to human cognition. People view some categories as 
natural kinds that have deep, inherent natures that make members of the category similar 
to one another in both obvious and nonobvious ways. Known as psychological 
essentialism, viewing categories as natural kinds can lead people to generalize prior 
knowledge about a category to novel entities and situations and facilitate learning  
(Gelman & Markman, 1987; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). For example, infants 
expect perceptually dissimilar objects to share internal characteristics if the objects are 
labeled with the same noun (Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2001). This can also be 
extended to biological categories such as animals. By identifying that a novel animal 
belongs to the familiar category “dog”, one can infer that it will likely display common 
properties of that category (e.g., is alive, plays fetch, etc.).  
This type of reasoning can also apply to kinds of people: Adults tend to assume 
that social categories capture fundamental, inherent similarities amongst collections of 
individuals and thus use prior knowledge about a social category to make inductive 
inferences about the physical, psychological, and behavioral properties of novel group 
members (e.g., Agerström, Björklund, Carlsson, & Rooth, 2012; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 
2006; Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, & Freeland, 2015; Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, 
Graham, & Handelsman, 2012; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017; Storage, Horne, 
Cimpian, & Leslie, 2016). For example, by learning that a firefighter helps in 
emergencies, one can then infer that another firefighter will also display the same 
characteristics.  
However, using this type of reasoning with social categories may cause people to 
use features such as surface similarity to infer intrinsic characteristics that are not 
necessarily true of the category (e.g., Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Hirschfeld, 
1996; Leslie, 2017; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012; Rothbart 
& Taylor, 1992). This in turn can give rise to prejudice and stereotypes with profound 
negative consequences. For instance, Arab job applicants receive fewer job interview 
invitations and need to appear warmer and more competent to have the same odds at 
getting a job interview (Agerström et al., 2012), teachers expect girls to have lower 
cognitive achievement than boys (Tindall & Hamill, 2004), and teachers expect lower 
achievement from African-American youths than from Caucasians (Richman, Bovelsky, 
Kroovand, Vacca, & West, 1997). It is therefore critical to understand how the tendency 
to use social categories to draw inferences about other people emerges. 
By preschool, the tendency to view social category members as sharing deep, 
inherent properties endowed with rich, inductive potential is well established (e.g., 
Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Waxman, 2013). From a 
young age, children spontaneously categorize individuals as members of a social group 
and use these categories to guide their expectations about the world. Children use group 
membership to draw a variety of inferences such as others’ preferences for objects and 
activities (e.g., Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; 
Martin, Eisenbud, & Rose, 1995), friendships (Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013), as well as 
knowledge and beliefs (Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; 
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Taylor, 1996). For example, 5-year-old children expect that members of the same 
ethnicity will prefer the same activities (Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006) and preschool-
aged children expect that members of the same, but not the opposite, sex will prefer the 
same toys (Martin et al., 1995). This suggests that the tendency to view members of a 
social group as sharing inherent properties emerges at a young age. Because this tendency 
is robust by preschool, it is possible that children may use social group membership as a 
basis of their inferences even earlier in life. Thus, it is important to understand when the 
tendency to use social categories to draw inferences about other people unfolds in early 
childhood. 
In my dissertation, I began to address these issues. Specifically, in three projects I 
examine the origins of social-group based inferences and how environmental influences 
shape these inferences across early childhood.  
In Project 1 of my dissertation, I examined the nature of social-group based 
inferences in infancy. Considerable research suggests that the ability to detect social 
groups emerges in infancy, but less research has examined when infants assume that 
members of a social group will be similar to one another or begin to make inductive 
inferences based on social group membership. In a recent study, colleagues and I showed 
that by 20 months, infants expect members of the same social group to share food 
preferences (Smith & Scott, 2017). This suggests that the tendency to use social group 
membership to make inductive inferences emerges early. However, many questions 
remain about the nature of these inferences. In particular, older children and adults use 
group membership to make inductive inferences about a variety of characteristics such as 
object and activity preferences, personality traits, behaviors, friendships, and beliefs 
(Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Martin et al.,1995; Shutts et al., 2013). In addition to food 
preferences, do infants expect members of a social group to share other characteristics? 
In Project 1, I began to address this question by examining whether infants expect 
members of a social group to share social dispositions. By preschool, children expect a 
person’s personality traits to remain stable over time (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Similarly, 
kindergartners and adults expect that someone who previously performed positive 
behaviors would likely engage in positive behaviors in other situations (Heyman & 
Gelman, 1998). Infants are also attentive to behavioral dispositions such as prosocial and 
antisocial behaviors. For example, 6- to 10-month old infants use the valence of an 
agent’s social actions to predict how others will react to that agent, and to guide their own 
interactions with that agent. Given this evidence that infants attend to social dispositions 
from early in life, it is possible that this may be a characteristic that infants attach to 
social group membership. Project 1 examined whether infants, like older children and 
adults, expect group members to share behavioral dispositions. 
Although the research by Smith and Scott (2017) suggests that the tendency to 
make social-group based inferences emerges early, in infancy, it is also clear that the 
particular inferences that children make about social groups are learned. To return to my 
earlier example, obviously children are not born knowing that firefighters help people in 
emergencies: this is something that they must learn. Support for this comes from research 
examining children’s understanding of a prevalent social category, race. Children are 
more likely to use race as a marker of group membership with increasing age, and 
children’s tendency to view race as stable varies depending on the community the child is 
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exposed to and the child’s own racial background (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Roberts & 
Gelman, 2015). Thus, it is clear that learning influences children’s reasoning about social 
categories.    
Project 2 explored how children may learn about social groups in their 
environment. It has long been assumed that the manner in which social groups are 
discussed in a child’s environment can influence children’s expectations about social 
categories (Bigler & Liben, 2007). For example, after 5- and 9-year-olds either heard the 
phrases “Rosie eats carrots whenever she can” or “Rosie is a carrot-eater,” the children 
who heard the latter judged that Rosie would display the stable characteristic of liking to 
eat carrots in the future (Gelman & Heyman, 1999). Additional research has shown that 
particular types of statements such as generic statements may influence beliefs about a 
social category. Adults and 4-year-olds who heard generic statements describing a novel 
social category (e.g., “Zarpies like to eat flowers”) were more likely to develop 
essentialist beliefs about the category than those who heard non-generic statements (e.g., 
“This one likes to eat flowers”; Rhodes et al., 2012).  
However, much of this prior work investigating how children may learn through 
parental statements has been conducted with older children who already essentialize 
robustly. The one prior study that has looked at younger children was based on 
experimenters reading to children in a lab setting (Rhodes et al., 2012). Research has yet 
to examine whether parental input shapes the development of essentialist beliefs in 
younger children, and if so, the particular aspects of parental input that might contribute 
to the development of essentialist beliefs at early ages. Project 2 investigated whether a 
natural conversation between parents and children could influence children’s beliefs 
about a social category. Parents and children read a picture book about a novel social 
group, and I examined whether and how parental input impacts children’s subsequent 
inferences about that social group.  
The results of Project 2 shed light on how proximal environmental factors (i.e. 
conversations with parents) affect children’s social-group inferences. Project 3 explored 
the impact of a more distal environmental influence, the salience of particular social 
categories in a child’s environment. The specific inferences that children make about 
social groups, and the attributes children attend to when making these inferences, vary 
with age and culture. For example, 4-year-olds in Israel pay more attention to ethnicity 
(i.e. Jewish or Arab) than gender when making inductive inferences about individuals 
(Birnbaum et al., 2010). In contrast, children in Northern Ireland tend to base their 
inferences on religion (i.e. Catholic or Protestant) over other social categories such as 
gender and ethnicity (Smyth, Feeney, Eidson, & Coley, 2017). These results suggest that 
aspects of the environment shape children’s inferences.  
However, the bulk of this research has been conducted in other countries such as 
Israel, where the salience of particular social groups is intertwined with violent, historical 
conflicts. Few studies have examined reasoning about ethnicity and religion in places 
where these groups are not involved in such high levels of conflict, such as in the United 
States. Studies in the United States have instead focused on how children use social 
categories based on gender and race. Research has yet to investigate how children in the 
United States use ethnicity information when reasoning about social categories. The few 
studies that have been conducted on religion have focused on primarily middle- to upper-
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class White samples (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Shutts et al., 2013; Smyth et al., 2017). 
Therefore, the nature of social-group based inferences in children from a more culturally, 
ethnically, and economically diverse sample is unknown.  
Project 3 addressed this issue by replicating a well-known study that was 
conducted in Israel (Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006). The relative inductive potential of 
social categories (i.e., ethnicity, gender, religion) was investigated with 5- to 7-year-olds 
from a culturally, ethnically, and economically diverse area. Based on previous research, 
we expected that children would use gender over other social categories as a basis for 
their inductive inferences (e.g., Gelman et al., 1986; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Taylor, 
1996; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). It was unclear how children would use religion 
and ethnicity information but we hypothesized that children in Merced County would be 
less likely to make inferences based on ethnicity or religion because these categories are 
less salient in their environment.  
Together, these studies shed light on the origins of social-group based inferences 
in infancy, and how the environment shapes these inferences across early childhood. 
Understanding the contexts that promote social-category generalization will aid in 
implementing measures to reduce the negative impact of stereotypes and prejudice. 
  5 
Chapter 2 
 Categorization is vital to human cognition. Forming categories allows us to 
organize information efficiently and quickly, guides our expectations when encountering 
category members, and facilitates learning (Gelman, 1988; Medin, Ojalehto, Waxman, & 
Bang, 2015). For example, upon identifying that a novel entity belongs to a familiar 
category (e.g., bear), one can infer that it likely possesses common properties of that 
category (e.g., it is alive, hibernates, etc.). Categories not only apply to biological kinds, 
but to kinds of people as well. Adults tend to assume social categories (e.g., doctors, 
women) capture fundamental, inherent similarities amongst collections of individuals and 
thus use prior knowledge about a social category to make inductive inferences about the 
physical, psychological, and behavioral properties of novel group members (e.g., 
Agerström et al., 2012). However, less is known about whether infants use social-group 
membership to make predictions about the characteristics of others.  
 In early infancy, children begin to notice features that are correlated with group 
membership and use them to recognize whether others are similar or dissimilar to 
themselves. For example, infants as young as 3 months prefer same-race faces (Kelly et 
al., 2005), and 10-month-olds are more likely to accept toys from individuals who speak 
their own language (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). Infants are also more likely to 
accept foods previously endorsed by a speaker of their native language (Shutts, Kinzler, 
McKee, & Spelke, 2009), and are more likely to imitate actions produced by a native-
language speaker (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013; Howard, Henderson, 
Carrazza, & Woodward, 2015). In addition to facial and linguistic features, infants attend 
to a variety of other features that could indicate an individual is a member of their own 
group. For example, infants attend to features such as food 
preferences and clothing when reasoning about group membership (Mahajan & Wynn, 
2012). Together, these results suggest that infants notice attributes that mark group 
membership and similarities to the self. 
Not only do infants detect attributes correlated with group membership, recent 
evidence suggests that infants also use social-group membership to draw inferences about 
novel group members. Research by Smith and Scott (2017) has shown that 20-month-old 
infants expect members of a social group to share food preferences. Infants were first 
introduced to two novel social groups marked with costumes and labels. Then, infants 
saw a member of one of the social groups demonstrate a preference for one of two foods. 
In the test trial, infants saw a member of either the same social group or a member of a 
different social group pick either the same food or a different food. Infants expected that 
members of the same, but not different, social groups would pick the same foods. This 
suggests that the tendency to use social-group membership to make inductive inferences 
emerges early.  
However, considerable questions remain about the nature of infants’ inferences. 
Previous research suggests that older children use group membership to make inductive 
inferences about a variety of characteristics such as preferences for objects and activities, 
personality traits, behaviors, friendships, and beliefs (Boseovski & Lee, 2006; 
Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Martin et al., 1995; Shutts et al., 2013). For instance, 
kindergartners expect that members of the same social category (e.g., individuals who are 
the same ethnicity) will share personality traits such as becoming angry at similar things, 
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or being afraid of the same things (Birnbaum et al., 2010). Do infants also expect 
members of a social group to share characteristics besides food preferences?  
One thing that children are sensitive to from early in life is social dispositions. 
Infants use the valence of an agent’s social actions to predict how others will react to, and 
guide their own interactions with, that agent (Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011). 
This suggests that infants are attentive to prosocial and antisocial behaviors and the 
distinction between them early in development. This raises the possibility that infants 
may make group-based inferences about behavioral dispositions similarly to 
characteristics like food preferences.  
However, such inferences require some understanding of prosocial and antisocial 
behaviors as stable characteristics, and the extent to which infants see prosocial/antisocial 
behaviors as a stable property of an agent remains unclear. The fact that infants will 
approach someone who was previously nice hints that infants might expect her to be nice 
again (Hamlin et al., 2011). Yet, direct tests of this have found mixed results (e.g., Duh, 
Wang, & Goldman, 2017; Koch, Kenward, Fawcett, & Gredebäck, 2015). For instance, 
17-month-old infants who saw an agent steal another agent’s toy anticipated she would 
steal again (Koch et al., 2015). But infants who saw the agent give a toy also anticipated 
she would later steal, making it unclear whether infants truly expected consistent 
behavior (Koch et al., 2015). Do infants see behavioral dispositions (e.g., being 
prosocial/antisocial) as a stable property of an individual? If so, do infants generalize 
behavioral dispositions across individuals in the same social group? 
To address these questions, twenty-month-old infants were tested in a violation-
of-expectation task using a procedure adapted from Smith and Scott (2017). Infants saw 
one member of a social group behave either prosocially or antisocially three times. In the 
test trial, they either saw the same agent as in the familiarization trial, or a different agent 
from that same social group. This agent behaved prosocially once and antisocially once. 
If infants expect a single agent to be consistent in her behavioral disposition, then they 
will expect the individual to show the same disposition in the test trial as in the 
familiarization trial, and will find it unexpected and look longer when she behaves 
differently (e.g., if she is prosocial in familiarization and antisocial in test) instead. 
Similarly, if infants expect members of a social group to share behavioral dispositions, 
then they will expect members of the same social group to behave similarly, and will find 
it unexpected and look longer when they behave differently (e.g., one member of the 
social group is antisocial and the other is prosocial) instead.  
Experiment 1 
Method  
Participants. 30 healthy infants participated (14 female, 16 male; Mage= 20 
months, 5 days, range 18 months, 9 days – 22 months, 5 days). Another 19 infants were 
tested but excluded because they failed to complete the experiment (15), because they did 
not watch the initial phase of one or both of the test trials (3), or because the child had a 
developmental disorder (1). Approximately equal numbers of infants were randomly 
assigned to each combination of test agent (same-agent, different-agent) and 
familiarization valence (prosocial, antisocial).  
The infants’ names in this and the following experiment were obtained from birth 
records provided by the California Department of Public Health, as well as from a 
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database of parents who had previously expressed interest in participating in research 
studies with their children. Parents were offered reimbursement for their transportation 
expenses, and their infant was given a small gift (book or t-shirt) for participating. 
Parents provided written informed consent for their infant’s participation.  
The racial and ethnic composition of the final sample for both experiments was 
76% Caucasian, 2% Asian, 2% American Indian or Alaska Native, 4% Black or African-
American; an additional 2% chose ‘other race’, 5% selected more than one race, and 9% 
chose not to respond. 33% of the sample identified as Hispanic or Latino, 65% identified 
as not Hispanic or Latino, and 2% chose not respond. In lieu of income information, we 
recorded the highest level of education reported by either parent: 2% completed less than 
high school, 18% completed high school, 20% completed an Associate’s Degree, 29% 
completed a Bachelor’s degree, 7% completed a Master’s degree, 18% completed a 
professional degree, and 6% chose not to respond. 
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of digitized high-definition video recordings of actors 
performing a series of actions. All infants saw a group-induction trial, three 
familiarization trials, and two test trials. A separate video was played for each trial. Each 
trial consisted of an initial phase followed by a final phase. The duration of the initial 
phase was fixed and identical for all participants. The duration of the final phase was 
infant-controlled. All trials are described from the infants’ perspective.  
Group-Induction Trial. All infants saw the same group-induction trial. At the 
start of the trial, three female actors sat around a table. Two of the actors (Fep-A, Fep-B) 
wore green t-shirts and green star-shaped glasses, while the third (Rab-A) wore a white 
button-up shirt and an orange sequined hat (see Figure 1). Actors that looked dissimilar 
on multiple features (i.e., different hair colors, hair styles, etc.) were selected to make it 
easier for infants to discriminate between them.   
All actors began the trial with their heads down. During the 8-s initial phase of the 
trial, the actors looked at one another and labeled themselves: Fep-A said “Hi, I’m a 
Fep.”  Fep-B said, “Hi, I’m a Fep too.” Finally, Rab-A said, “Hi, I’m a Rab.” As each 
actor labeled herself, she looked back and forth between the other two actors. When not 
labeling themselves, the actors looked at the speaking actor as she spoke. After all actors 
had labeled themselves, the actors looked down and paused. The infants viewed this 
paused scene until the trial ended (see Apparatus and Procedure section for trial-ending 
criteria). 
Familiarization trials. Infants then received three familiarization trials in which 
Fep-A demonstrated her social disposition (i.e., prosocial or antisocial) toward a neutral 
agent. The neutral agent looked very dissimilar to Fep-A and wore a plain red t-shirt. We 
used a neutral agent so that infants only had to keep track of one individual’s social 
disposition. The valence of this disposition varied across infants.  
In the prosocial valence condition, infants saw Fep-A behave prosocially three 
times. In the first familiarization trial, Fep-A and the neutral agent sat facing one another 
at a table. Fep-B and Rab-A were no longer present. Centered between them was a pile of 
multi-colored Legos. During the 15-s initial phase of the trial, the neutral agent selected 
and stacked four Legos of the same color. Fep-A built her own multi-colored stack while 
observing the neutral agent’s actions. After stacking four blocks, the neutral agent looked 
for another Lego of the same color but was unable to find one. Then, Fep-A pointed to 
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the sought-after Lego so that neutral agent could locate it. Fep-A then placed the Lego on 
top her stack and smiled. The neutral agent then smiled at Fep-A and both agents 
proceeded to look down and pause until infants looked away (see Figure 2). The next two 
familiarization trials were highly similar except that on each trial the neutral agent built a 
different color stack of Legos, the neutral agent displayed a different seeking behavior, 
and hence Fep-A’s prosocial responses varied. In the second familiarization trial, the 
neutral agent strained to reach a Lego but was unable to reach it; Fep-A pushed the block 
towards the neutral agent so that she could reach it. In the third familiarization trial, the 
neutral agent needed a Lego that was inside of a container but was unable to open it; Fep-
A helped the neutral agent remove the lid from the container. Infants thus saw Fep-A 
behave prosocially three times.  
The antisocial familiarization trials were identical to the prosocial familiarization 
trials except that Fep-A behaved antisocially by taking the Lego before the neutral agent 
located it (first trial), moving the Lego out of the agent’s reach (second trial), and 
slamming the container closed when the agent tried to retrieve a Lego from it (third trial; 
see Figure 2). On each trial, upon Fep-A behaving antisocially, the neutral agent 
displayed sadness by furrowing her brow and pouting her lips while looking at Fep-A.  
Same-agent test trials. Infants saw a prosocial and an antisocial test trial; the 
order of the test trials was counterbalanced across infants. In the prosocial event, Fep-A 
and the neutral agent again sat at a table seated across from one another with a pile of 
Legos between them (see Figure 3). During the 16-s initial phase of the trial, the neutral 
agent selected and stacked four Legos of the same color. Fep-A built her own multi-
colored stack while observing the neutral agent’s actions. After stacking four blocks, the 
neutral agent looked for another Lego of the same color. Once the agent located the one 
she wanted, she reached for the block but accidentally knocked it out of reach off of the 
table. Fep-A then retrieved the block and handed it to the neutral agent. The neutral agent 
then placed the block on her own tower, and smiled at Fep-A. Fep-A and the agent then 
looked down at the table and paused until the trial ended. The antisocial event was 
identical, except that instead of handing the block to the neutral agent, Fep-A put the 
block on her own tower and the neutral agent displayed sadness.   
Different-agent test trials. The procedure for the different-agent condition was 
identical to that of the same-agent condition with one exception: in the test trials, infants 
saw a different Fep (Fep-B) than in the familiarization trials.  
Apparatus and Procedure 
Infants sat on their parent’s lap 91.5 cm in front of a large television screen (68.5 
cm x 122 cm). The room was dimly lit. A camera hidden at the base of the television 
(centered, 89 cm above the floor) recorded the infant’s face during the experiment. 
Parents were instructed to close their eyes or look down to avoid biasing their infant’s 
responses.  
The television was connected to a Macintosh computer located to the left of the 
infant behind a sound-dampening room divider. This computer controlled the 
presentation of the experimental stimuli using custom software written in Python (Peirce, 
2007). The software selected the correct version of each trial based on the infant’s 
condition and presented the video in the center of the television screen (each video 
measured 64 cm x 37 cm on screen). The software also controlled the duration of each 
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trial. An experimenter observed the infant on a monitor and pressed a button on the 
keyboard whenever the infant attended to the video. The software separately computed 
looking times for the fixed-duration and infant-controlled portions of each trial; looking 
times during the infant-controlled portion of the trial were used to determine when each 
trial ended. In between trials, an attention-getter (a yellow smiley face measuring 28 cm x 
20 cm) was displayed on the screen for 4 seconds and a brief tone was played to attract 
the infant’s attention back to the television screen. 
At the start of the experiment, the attention-getter was presented in the center of 
the television screen. When the infant attended to the screen, the experimenter initiated 
the presentation of the stimuli on the television screen. Infants first viewed the group 
induction trial, followed by the three familiarization trials appropriate for their condition. 
Each trial ended when the infant either (1) looked away for 2 consecutive seconds after 
having looked for at least 5 cumulative seconds or (2) looked for 60 cumulative seconds 
without looking away for at least 2 consecutive seconds.  
Finally, infants viewed two test trials appropriate for their condition; half the 
infants in each condition saw the prosocial test trial first and half saw the antisocial test 
trial first. The test trials ended when infants (1) looked away for 2 consecutive seconds 
after having looked for at least 5 cumulative seconds or (2) looked for 30 cumulative 
seconds without looking away for at least 2 consecutive seconds.  
Coding 
In order to present events with trial duration contingent on the infant’s attention, 
online coding was conducted by the experimenter (blind to condition and test trial), as 
described above. All infants were then coded offline from silent video by a trained coder 
who was naïve to the condition and the order of the test trials that the infant received. For 
each trial, the coder indicated the infant’s direction of gaze (at the stimuli or away) for 
each frame of the video. Another trained, naïve coder coded all sessions offline.  The two 
offline coders agreed on the child’s direction of gaze for 96% of video frames. Trials in 
which agreement between the two coders was less than 90% (8/186) or the two coders 
disagreed on whether the child met the criteria to end the trial (1/186) were resolved by a 
third coder. With the exception of 6 trials in which the third coder agreed with the second 
coder (4 familiarization trials, 2 test trials), the primary coder’s data were used in all 
analyses. In the cases where the third coder agreed with the second coder, the second 
coder’s data was used instead. 
The infants were highly attentive during the initial phase of the familiarization 
and test trials, attending, on average, for 98% and 90% of the initial phases, respectively. 
The main question of investigation was whether infants expected individuals to be 
consistent in their behavioral dispositions over time. Therefore, for the analyses, each test 
trial was categorized as either a consistent or inconsistent test event. In the consistent test 
event, Fep-A’s actions in the test trial were consistent with her valence in the 
familiarization trials. In the inconsistent test event, Fep-A’s actions differed in valence 
from her actions in the familiarization trials.  
Preliminary analyses of the test data indicated no significant main effects or 
interactions with sex, all Fs < 2.73, ps > .12. The data were therefore collapsed across sex 
in subsequent analyses.  
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Results and discussion 
Infants’ looking times during the test trials were analyzed using an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with condition (same-agent, different-agent), familiarization valence 
(prosocial, antisocial), and test trial order as between-subjects factors and test event 
(inconsistent, consistent) as a within-subjects factor (See Figure 4). The analysis revealed 
a significant interaction of condition and test event, F(1, 22) = 4.74 p = .04, ηp2 = .18. 
Planned comparisons indicated that infants in the same-agent condition looked reliably 
longer at the inconsistent (M = 14.25, SE = 1.84) than the consistent event (M = 8.98, SE 
= 1.74), F(1, 22) = 5.06, p = .035,  ηp2 = .19. In contrast, infants in the different-agent 
condition looked about equally to the inconsistent (M = 13.30, SE = 1.84) and consistent 
(M = 15.25, SE = 1.74) test events, F < 1  
However, this two-way interaction was qualified by two three-way interactions. 
There was a marginal interaction of condition, trial order, and test event, F(1, 22) = 3.64 
p = .069, ηp2 = .14. There was also an interaction of condition, familiarization valence, 
and test event, F(1, 22) = 4.74 p = .038, ηp2 = .18. No other effects were significant, all 
Fs < 1.83, all ps > .19.  
Examination of the interaction of condition, trial order, and test event revealed 
that in the different-agent condition, infants looked longer at the second test event they 
were shown (MTest1 = 13.3, SETest1 = 1.84; MTest2 =15.25, SETest2 = 1.74). This was not the 
case in the same-agent condition, where infants instead looked longer at the inconsistent 
event, regardless of order.  
Exploration of the interaction of condition, familiarization valence, and test event 
indicated that in the different-agent condition, infants who received the antisocial 
familiarization trials looked longer at the inconsistent test event (M = 16.23, SE = 2.67) 
than at the consistent test event (M = 14.56, SE = 2.56). In contrast, infants who received 
the prosocial familiarization trials looked longer at the consistent test event (M = 15.93, 
SE = 2.37) than at the inconsistent test event (M = 10.32, SE = 2.5). Overall, this means 
that infants in the different-agent condition looked longer at the prosocial test event. This 
pattern of results did not emerge in the same-agent condition. These infants looked longer 
at the inconsistent test event (M = 14.25, SE = 1.84) than the consistent event (M = 8.98, 
SE = 1.74) regardless of familiarization valence.  
In the same-agent condition, infants looked longer at the inconsistent test event, 
suggesting that infants expected Fep-A to be consistent in her behavioral dispositions. 
However, infants did not generalize Fep-A’s behavioral disposition to Fep-B. It is 
possible that when infants in the different-agent condition saw the first test trial, they had 
no expectation of how Fep-B would behave because infants did not generalize Fep-A’s 
behavioral disposition from the familiarization trials to the test trials. Instead, after seeing 
Fep-B behave in the first test trial, infants may have expected Fep-B to display the same 
behavioral disposition in the second test trial and found it unexpected if she did not. 
Thus, infants’ looking time behavior may have been influenced by the order in which the 
test events occurred. In the different-agent condition, infants tended to look longer at the 
prosocial test events, suggesting that infants’ looking time behavior was also influenced 
by the valence of the events. It appears that infants’ reasoning about the stability of 
behavioral dispositions might be different for prosocial and antisocial individuals.  
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The interaction of condition, familiarization valence, and test event raises a 
potential issue given prior research that suggests that children react differently to positive 
and negative valence. For instance, Premack and Premack (1997) found that children tend 
to look longer at events that are prosocial in valence than antisocial in valence. By 
recoding the test events as inconsistent and consistent in the current analyses, the test 
events were collapsed across prosocial and antisocial events. If infants had a tendency to 
look longer at a particular valence, it may have been masked in the analyses.  
To investigate this possibility, the test data was analyzed again in terms of the 
valence of the test events (prosocial, antisocial), rather than whether the test event was 
consistent or inconsistent with the familiarization trials. Infants’ looking times during the 
test trial were then analyzed using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with condition 
(same-agent, different-agent), familiarization valence (prosocial, antisocial), and test trial 
order as between-subjects factors and test event (prosocial, antisocial) as a within-
subjects factor.  
There was no main effect of event, F < 1, suggesting that infants did not have a 
preference for either the prosocial or antisocial event. There was a significant interaction 
of condition and event, F(1, 22) = 4.86 p = .038, ηp2 = .18. This effect stemmed from the 
fact that infants in the same-agent condition looked slightly longer at the antisocial test 
event (M = 13.43, SE = 1.90) than the prosocial test event (M = 9.80, SE = 1.67), whereas 
those in the different-agent condition looked longer at the prosocial test event (M = 16.11, 
SE = 1.67) than the antisocial test event (M = 12.44, SE = 1.90). However, neither of 
these comparisons reached significance, both Fs < 2.46, ps > .13.  
This interaction was qualified by a 3-way interaction of condition, familiarization 
valence, and test event, F(1, 22) = 4.74 p = .04, ηp2 = .18. Conceptually, this is the same 
effect as the two-way interaction of condition and event reported in the previous set of 
analyses. In the same-agent condition, infants looked longer at the test event that was 
inconsistent with the valence they had seen in the familiarization trials, whereas those in 
the different-agent condition did not exhibit this pattern.  
There was also a marginal 4-way interaction of condition, familiarization valence, 
test trial order, and test event, F(1, 22) = 3.64,  p = .069,  ηp2 = .14. There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1.83, all ps > .19. This interaction 
emerged in part because infants’ looking times in the different-agent condition were 
influenced by both trial order and test event valence, as discussed above. Thus, in the 
different-agent condition there was an overall tendency for infants to look longer at 
whichever test event they saw second. The one exception was infants in the different-
agent condition that saw Fep-A behave prosocially and received the prosocial test event 
first. These infants looked longer at the prosocial event than the antisocial event. Because 
the majority of infants in the different-agent condition merely looked longer at the second 
test event they received regardless of its valence, there is no evidence that infants 
generalized behaviors across members of a social group.  
In the same-agent condition, infants showed an overall pattern to look longer at 
the event that was inconsistent with how Fep-A behaved in the familiarization trials. The 
one exception was infants who saw Fep-A behave antisocially and received the antisocial 
test event first. These infants looked longer at the antisocial test event. Typically, in 
violation-of-expectation paradigms, there is a tendency for infants to look longer at the 
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first event they are shown. Because the antisocial event occurs first in this condition, 
infants’ expectation of consistency may be overpowered by the order in which the test 
events occurred. If this is true, then perhaps with more analytic power, we would be able 
to detect infants’ expectation of consistency above and beyond the effect of test event 
order. An alternative possibility is that there may be a difference in infants’ attention to 
and/or reasoning about prosocial and antisocial individuals, and this difference in 
attention lead to the marginal 4-way interaction of condition, familiarization valence, test 
trial order, and test event. Perhaps infants treat prosocial and antisocial individuals as 
inherently different from one another, and this results in infants’ ability to generalize Fep-
A’s prosocial behaviors across situations, but failure to generalize Fep-A’s antisocial 
behaviors in some circumstances. If infants treat antisocial individuals differently than 
prosocial individuals, infants’ ability to reason about antisocial behavioral dispositions 
may be more arduous and nuanced. Further investigation is needed to clarify these 
findings.  
Overall, these results suggest there is a pattern for infants in the same-agent 
condition to expect a single agent to be consistent in her behaviors. If Fep-A was 
prosocial in the familiarization trials, infants expected her to display the same valence 
behavior in the test trial. In the different-agent condition, infants did not expect 
consistency in behaviors. If Fep-A was prosocial in the familiarization trials, infants had 
no expectations about whether a different Fep, Fep-B, would be prosocial or antisocial. 
One possible interpretation of these findings is that infants did not generalize 
social disposition across members of a social group because social dispositions are not 
something infants readily attach to social group membership at this age. Alternatively, 
infants’ ability to attribute dispositions and keep track of them across situations may be 
fragile at this age. It could be that any change in the situation could cause infants to have 
no expectation about how the person would behave in the test trial. The fact that infants 
who saw the antisocial familiarization trials and consistent test event first did not 
generalize Fep-A’s behavioral disposition across situations, as discussed above, could be 
seen as evidence for this possibility. It may not have been that infants did not generalize 
characteristics across members of a social group, but that the presence of a new person in 
the test trial may have interfered with infants’ ability to reason about social dispositions. 
If this possibility is true, then changing some other aspect of the situational context might 
cause infants to fail to generalize social dispositions even within the same agent.  
Experiment 2 
 
 In Experiment 1, infants expected a single agent to be consistent in her social 
disposition. However, infants did not generalize social dispositions across members of a 
social group. Infants’ failure to generalize behavioral dispositions in Experiment 1 may 
have occurred because infants do not readily attach behavioral dispositions to group 
membership. Alternatively, it is possible that result may have happened because infants’ 
reasoning about behavioral dispositions is particularly fragile at this age. To test these 
possibilities, Experiment 2 investigated whether infants expect a single agent to remain 
consistent in her social disposition across situations. Infants saw the same familiarization 
trials as in Experiment 1, followed by test trials in which the same actor interacted with a 
neutral agent in a different context than in the familiarization trials (i.e. rolling a ball). If 
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infants expect a single agent to be consistent in her behavioral disposition across 
situations, it would suggest that in Experiment 1, infants’ ability to encode social 
disposition information was sufficiently robust to support some forms of generalization. 
In turn, this would suggest that infants in in the different-agent condition of Experiment 1 
did not generalize Fep-A’s behavioral disposition to Fep-B because infants do not 
generalize social dispositions across members of a social group. If, however, infants do 
not expect a single agent to have a consistent behavioral disposition across situations, it 
would instead suggest that infants’ failure to generalize across group membership in 
Experiment 1 was because infants’ encoding of the social disposition was not sufficiently 
robust to support generalizations, even within agent.  
Method  
Participants. 15 healthy infants participated (7 female, 8 male; Mage = 19 months, 
25 days, range 18 months, 10 days – 21 months, 22 days). Another 8 infants were tested 
but excluded because they failed to complete the experiment (6), because the child was 
highly active in 4 or more trials (1), or because the child was deaf (1). Seven infants were 
randomly assigned to the prosocial familiarization valence condition (Mage = 19 months, 
25 days), and eight infants were randomly assigned to the antisocial familiarization 
valence condition (Mage = 19 months, 25 days).  
Apparatus, Stimuli and Procedure 
 The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with the 
exception of the events shown in the test trial.  
Infants saw two test trials. Infants received both a prosocial event and an 
antisocial event  (order counterbalanced). In the prosocial event, Fep-A and the neutral 
agent sat at a table seated across from one another (see Figure 5). In the neutral agent’s 
hand was a rubber ball. During the 13-s initial phase of the trial, the neutral agent raised 
the ball towards Fep-A to indicate that she wanted to play. Fep-A then nodded, and the 
neutral agent proceeded to roll the ball to her. Once Fep-A had the ball in her hands, she 
tossed the ball back-and-forth between her hands three times. Then, the neutral agent 
lifted her hands out towards the neutral agent indicating she wanted Fep-A to roll the ball 
back to her. Fep-A rolled the ball back to the agent. The neutral agent then tossed the ball 
back-and-forth between her hands three times. Then, she looked up at Fep-A and smiled. 
Fep-A and the agent then looked down at the table and paused until the trial ended.  
In the antisocial event, once Fep-A had the ball, she tossed it back and forth 
between her hands. Then, Fep-A looked toward the agent, then back towards the ball and 
then proceeded to aggressively hide the ball in her own lap under the table. The neutral 
agent then looked down towards her hands, back up at Fep-A, and then cast her eyes 
downward and frowned. Fep-A and the agent then looked down at the table and paused 
until the trial ended (see Figure 5).  
Coding 
The coding was conducted in the same manner as Experiment 1.  Trials in which 
agreement between the two coders was less than 90% (1/90) or the two coders disagreed 
on whether the child met the criteria to end the trial (2/90) were resolved by a third coder. 
With the exception of 1 test trial in which the third coder agreed with the second coder, 
the primary coder’s data were used in all analyses. In the cases where the third coder 
agreed with the second coder, the second coder’s data was used instead. 
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Results and discussion 
Infants’ looking times during the test trial were analyzed using an analysis of 
variance with familiarization valence (prosocial, antisocial) and test trial order as 
between-subjects factors and test event (consistent, inconsistent)1 as a within-subjects 
factor.  
There was a main effect of test event F(1, 11) = 7.46, p = .02, ηp2 = .40. Planned 
comparisons revealed that infants looked reliably longer at the consistent test event (M = 
16.55, SE = 2.58) than at the inconsistent test event (M = 10.31, SE = 1.43). This effect 
was qualified by a marginal interaction of familiarization valence and test event, F(1, 11) 
= 4.11, p = .068, ηp2 = .27. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, 
all Fs < 2.34, all ps > .15.  These results differ from the pattern that we saw in the same-
agent condition in Experiment 1, suggesting that as we suspected, infants’ understanding 
of behavioral dispositions as an enduring attribute is fragile at this age. Although this 
tendency to look longer at the consistent event is unusual for a violation-of-expectation 
paradigm, it is not without precedent. There are a small number of findings where 
children exhibit this looking time pattern (e.g., Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003). It is 
thought that when this pattern of looking time occurs, it is because the situation is 
especially challenging for children, and thus children may be preferentially focusing on 
the event that is easier to understand (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Pelucchi, Hay, & Saffran, 
2009). If this explanation is correct, it would be consistent with the idea that infants’ 
understanding of behavioral dispositions is fragile at this age, resulting in infants 
preferentially attending to the event that is easier to process (i.e. the consistent event).  
Exploration of the interaction of familiarization valence and test event revealed 
that when infants received the prosocial familiarization trials, they looked significantly 
longer at the consistent test event (M = 21.54, SE = 3.73) than at the inconsistent event 
(M = 10.65, SE = 2.06), F(1, 11) = 10.84, p = .007. When infants received the antisocial 
familiarization trials, there was a trend for infants to look longer at the consistent test 
event (M = 11.57, SE = 3.57) that at the inconsistent event (M = 9.96, SE = 1.97), but this 
difference did not reach significance, F < 1. However, it is not without precedent that 
infants responded differentially to the prosocial and antisocial valenced events given that 
two prior studies with 17-month-olds that investigated infants’ expectations of stability in 
an individual’s behavioral disposition also found differences in children’s expectations 
depending on the valence of the event (Duh et al., 2017; Koch et al., 2015). In these 
studies, after seeing an individual behave antisocially, children expected them to behave 
antisocially again, but the same expectation of consistency did not occur when the 
individual was initially prosocial. Overall, these findings suggest that infants’ 
understanding of prosocial and antisocial behaviors as enduring dispositions is 
particularly fragile at this young age.  
 
General Discussion 
Recent evidence suggests that infants expect members of a social group to share 
stable characteristics such as food preferences (Smith & Scott, 2017). However, older 
                                                
1 An analysis of the test data in terms of the valence of the test events (prosocial, 
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children expect that members of the same social group will share a variety of 
characteristics (Boseovski & Lee, 2006; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Martin et al., 
1995; Shutts et al., 2013). In Experiment 1, infants were introduced to two arbitrary 
social groups, and then saw one member of a social group (Fep-A) either display a 
prosocial or antisocial disposition. In the test trial, infants either saw the same agent in 
the familiarization trial (Fep-A), or a different agent from the same social group (Fep-B), 
behave prosocially once and antisocially once. Infants expected Fep-A to be consistent in 
her behavioral disposition, and looked longer in the test trial if she was not. However, 
infants did not generalize behavioral dispositions across members of a social group. After 
watching Fep-A behave prosocially, infants had no expectation about how another Fep 
would behave. The current research provides the first empirical evidence that, at least 
under some circumstances, infants expect a single individual to be consistent in their 
behavioral dispositions.  
Experiment 2 further clarified whether infants’ failure to generalize behavioral 
dispositions in Experiment 1 was because: (1) infants do not attach social dispositions to 
social group membership at this age, or (2) infants have difficulty generalizing social 
dispositions. Specifically, Experiment 2 investigated whether infants expect a single 
agent to remain consistent in her social disposition across situations. After watching Fep-
A behave prosocially in a lego-building context, infants did not expect the agent to be 
prosocial in a ball-rolling context, suggesting that infants did not expect a single agent to 
be consistent across situations. Because this pattern of results differs from the pattern 
seen in Experiment 1, it suggests that infants’ failure to generalize in Experiment 1 was 
likely because infants' understanding of behavioral dispositions as enduring, stable 
attributes is fragile at this age. An additional indication of the fragility of infants’ 
reasoning is that in some instances, infants’ expectations of consistency were affected by 
valence. Specifically, in the different-agent condition of Experiment 1, and in Experiment 
2, infants that received the antisocial familiarization trials displayed a different pattern of 
looking than did the infants that received the prosocial familiarization trials. 
Experiment 1 adds important findings to the body of literature that investigates 
children’s preferences for prosocial over antisocial others. In these studies, infants are 
placed in a forced-choice situation where infants are asked to pick between two agents 
(e.g., to look at object A or object B; to play with object A or object B) that either helped, 
or prevented someone from reaching their goal. In these situations, infants will typically 
choose to interact with the agent that was previously helpful (Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010). This 
demonstrates that infants can clearly detect and distinguish between prosocial and 
antisocial individuals, and can use this information to make decisions about whom to 
interact with themselves. However, this does not necessarily mean that infants in these 
studies expect the agent’s behavioral disposition to be enduring and consistent. Infants 
are only reasoning about the agent’s behavior in a single instance, making it unclear 
whether infants truly expect agents to be behaviorally consistent. Experiment 1 provides 
evidence that within a given context, infants are able to abstract behavioral dispositions in 
a situation, and expect an agent to remain consistent in her behavioral dispositions.   
However, at this age infants may be at a transitional stage. Infants may be just 
beginning to expect people to be consistent in their behavioral dispositions, and thus 
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require clear, concrete information in order to form such expectations. Infants’ 
expectations of consistency can be disrupted by various factors such as the particular 
valence of an agent’s behavior, or by a small change in the situational context. Changes 
in these factors may make the situation especially challenging for infants to reason about.   
It is therefore possible that children’s understanding of consistency in behavioral 
dispositions might benefit from additional supportive information. Perhaps infants need 
more instances of Fep-A’s behavior in order to strengthen infants’ expectations of 
consistency. It is also possible that additional, varied types of information might 
strengthen infants’ expectations of consistency. In Experiment 1 and 2, Fep-A interacted 
with the same neutral agent in each familiarization trial. Therefore, infants may have 
interpreted Fep-A’s behavioral disposition as pertaining to that particular individual. 
Perhaps if Fep-A interacted with a different neutral agent in each familiarization trial, it 
would demonstrate that Fep-A behaves a particular way regardless of the person they are 
interacting with, and infants would be more likely to form more abstract inferences about 
the stability of Fep-A’s behavioral disposition (e.g., that Fep-A is a nice person). 
Providing stronger evidence may make it easier for infants to recognize stable 
dispositions. This could then lead infants to generalize behavioral dispositions within a 
single agent, across contexts.  
The current studies provide no evidence that infants generalize dispositions across 
members of a social group. However, it could be that if provided with clearer information 
about the stability of the agent’s behavioral disposition (as discussed above), infants may 
generalize behavioral dispositions across members of a social group. Alternatively, it is 
possible that at this age, infants do not attach behavioral dispositions to social group 
members. Thus, slightly older infants might demonstrate a more robust understanding of 
stable nature of dispositions, and expect that members of a social group will share 
behavioral dispositions. 
Although infants in the current study did not generalize behavioral dispositions 
across social group members, prior research using a very similar paradigm to the one 
used in the current studies found that infants expect members of a social group to share 
food preferences (Smith & Scott, 2017). One possible reason this finding differed from 
the current results may be that food preferences are more robustly associated with group 
membership at this age than are behavioral dispositions. Previous work has argued that 
because food and eating are fundamentally social and cultural in nature (e.g., Liberman, 
Woodward, Sullivan, & Kinzler, 2016; Shutts, Kinzler, & DeJesus, 2013), infants may 
have a specialized, early emerging system for reasoning about foods. For example, 
Liberman et al. (2016) found that whereas infants generalized food preferences across 
members of a social group, infants did not generalize object preferences across members 
of a group. One possibility for this finding is that infants’ reasoning about food may be 
qualitatively different than infants’ reasoning about non-food items. As previously 
mentioned, reasoning about behavioral dispositions appears to be somewhat challenging 
for infants. Because infants may be particularly sensitive to food preferences as a marker 
of group membership, and because foods may be easier for infants to reason about, 
infants may associate food preferences with social groups at a younger age than 
behavioral dispositions.  
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Finally, these findings suggest there may be an important role for learning in 
infants’ reasoning about behavioral dispositions. Whereas school-aged children and 
adults readily use group membership to make predictions about the behavior of others 
(e.g., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Bosekovski & Lee, 2006; Diesendruck & Ha Levi, 2006), 
infants in the current study did not. This may suggest that attributing characteristics to 
members of a social group may not be an automatic process. Instead, infants may first 
need to learn about the types of properties that they should associate with social group 
membership from their environment. One potential way children may learn about social 
groups may be through their parents. Previous research with 4-year-old children has 
found that the types of statements a parent makes when discussing a social group with 
their child can impact the beliefs and expectations that their child forms about that 
particular social category (Rhodes et al., 2012). Thus, it is possible that environmental 
influences such as parental input may influence children’s social group based reasoning 
at even younger ages. 
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Chapter 3 
Adults routinely use social group membership to draw inferences about the 
characteristics of others. Adults form essentialist beliefs about certain social categories, 
assuming that members of those social categories share inherent, stable characteristics. 
This makes social categories inductively powerful and can lead adults to use group 
membership to draw inferences about novel group members. Previous research suggests 
that the tendency to use social group membership to make predictions about the 
characteristics of others is robust by preschool. By this age, children form essentialist 
beliefs, assuming that social-category members share underlying essences that make 
them inherently similar to one another, but different form others (e.g., Bigler et al., 1997; 
Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Gelman et al., 1986; Martin et al., 
1995; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017; Shutts et al., 2013; Taylor, 1996; Waxman, 2013). 
Recent evidence suggests that the tendency to expect that members of a social group will 
be similar to one another emerges early in life. For example, infants as young as 20 
months expect that members of the same social group, but not different social groups, 
will share stable characteristics such as food preferences (Smith & Scott, 2017).  
Although this tendency may emerge early, the attributes children attend to when 
reasoning about social groups and the specific inferences that they make about them vary 
by age and culture. For example, when asked to make inductive inferences about the 
psychological or behavioral property of a novel character, children in Israel base their 
inferences on ethnicity information over other social categories (Birnbaum et al., 2010; 
Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006). In contrast, children in Northern Ireland are more likely to 
use religion information as a basis of their inductive inferences (Smyth et al., 2017). This 
suggests that the particular inferences that 
children make about social groups, and the characteristics that children use when making 
these inferences must be learned. 
It has been proposed that the manner in which social groups are discussed in the 
environment may impact how children form beliefs and expectations about social 
categories (Bigler & Liben, 2007). For example, highlighting an individual’s group 
membership through explicit labeling or functional use of group labels (e.g., having girls 
line up for lunch first in the classroom) may influence children to believe that members 
of these groups share stable, non-obvious characteristics. Thus, even when adults 
distinguish among individuals in a completely neutral manner, children may infer that the 
grouping criteria is an important basis for categorization and construct beliefs about these 
groups based on labels. Additionally, after 5- and 9-year-olds either heard the phrases 
“Rosie eats carrots whenever she can” or “Rosie is a carrot-eater,” the children who heard 
the latter judged that Rosie was more likely to eat carrots in the future (Gelman & 
Heyman, 1999). 
Similar effects have been observed in children as young as four. Rhodes and 
colleagues found that 4-year-olds’ beliefs about a social category were influenced by the 
types of statements they heard during a picture book session (Rhodes et al., 2012). An 
experimenter read a picture book about a novel social category, Zarpies, to the children. 
Each page presented a picture of a single person displaying a unique physical or 
behavioral property. A single line of text describing the depicted property accompanied 
each page using the language specified by the participant’s condition. Some children 
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heard generic sentences about the social category (e.g., “Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies hate 
ice cream”), some heard specific sentences (e.g., “Look at this Zarpie! This one hates ice 
cream”), while some were provided with no social-group label (e.g., “Look at this one! 
This one hates ice cream”). Children who heard either type of generic statement  (generic 
or specific) were more likely to endorse essentialist beliefs about Zarpies. That is, they 
were more likely to view Zarpie category members as sharing a deep, underlying inherent 
nature that make Zarpie members highly similar to one another, but distinctly different 
from other categories. Children who heard no social-group label were less likely to 
endorse essentialist beliefs about Zarpies.  
These findings suggest that it is possible for an environmental factor as simple as 
the sentences used to describe a social category to affect children’s expectations about 
social groups. However, in Rhodes et al. (2012), an experimenter read the book to the 
child multiple times over multiple research sessions. Therefore, it is unclear how children 
may learn about social groups through natural and more likely contexts, such as through 
how parents label and discuss social groups in brief, normal conversation. Further, the 
study used preschool-aged children who are known to form essentialist beliefs quite 
robustly. It remains unclear how children come to form these particular beliefs before 
essentialist tendencies are well established.   
The current study explored one manner in which younger children may learn 
about social groups in their environment: parental input. Three-year-olds and their 
parents first viewed a picture book about a novel social category, Zarpies, adapted from 
Rhodes et al. (2012). Across participants, we varied the types of sentences included in 
book. Half of the participants received the generic book sentences, and half received the 
no-label book sentences. Then, in a violation-of-expectation video task, children saw a 
Zarpie display behaviors that were either consistent or inconsistent with those in the 
picture book. We then examined whether children learned about the Zarpies 
characteristics through the brief parental action and expected the Zarpies in the video task 
to behave similarly. Additionally, we examined whether specific types of parental input 
predicted children’s learning about the Zarpie characteristics.  
We predicted that children who received the generic book sentences would be 
more likely to learn about the Zarpie behaviors in the book and look longer at the Zarpie-
inconsistent events than children who received the no-label book sentences. Further, we 
predicted that parents who talked more about the Zarpie behaviors and highlighted 
similarities and differences between the child and Zarpies would display more robust 
learning about the Zarpie behaviors. 
Experiment 3 
Method  
 
Participants. 63 healthy children participated (33 female, 30 male; Mage= 36 
months, 17 days, range 35 months, 6 days – 39 months, 9 days). Another 4 children were 
tested but excluded because they failed to complete the picture-book task (2), because 
they failed to complete the video task (1), or because they had an insufficient number of 
useable trials in the video task (1)2. Approximately equal numbers of children were 
                                                
2 See Coding section for information on eliminated trials.  
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randomly assigned to either the generic statement condition (N = 32) or the no-label 
statement condition (N = 31).  
The children’s names in this and the following experiment were obtained from 
birth records provided by the California Department of Public Health, as well as from a 
database of parents who had previously expressed interest in participating in research 
studies with their children. Parents were offered reimbursement for their transportation 
expenses, and their child was given a small gift (book or t-shirt) for participating. Parents 
provided written informed consent for their child’s participation.  
The racial and ethnic composition of the final sample was 64% Caucasian, 2% 
Asian, 3% American Indian or Alaska Native, 6% Black or African-American, 2% 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; an additional 6% chose ‘other race’, 11% selected 
more than one race, and 6% chose not to respond. 41% of the sample identified as 
Hispanic or Latino, 53% identified as not Hispanic or Latino, and 6% chose not respond. 
In lieu of income information, we recorded the highest level of education reported by 
either parent: 2% completed less than high school, 17% completed high school, 28% 
completed an Associate’s Degree, 30% completed a Bachelor’s degree, 5% completed a 
Master’s degree, 16% completed a professional degree, and 2% chose not to respond. 
Apparatus 
The picture-book task was conducted in one room and the video task took place in 
a different room.  
 Picture-book task. Children sat on their parent’s lap facing a table. A camera 
was centered on the table to capture the parents’ verbal utterances. A second camera was 
mounted above and behind the child in order to capture the stimuli.  
Video-task. Children sat on their parent’s lap 91.5 cm in front of a large 
television screen (68.5 cm x 122 cm). The room was dimly lit. A camera hidden at the 
base of the television (centered, 89 cm above the floor) recorded the child’s face during 
the experiment. The television was connected to a Macintosh computer located to the left 
of the child behind a sound-dampening room divider. This computer controlled the 
presentation of the experimental stimuli using custom software written in Python (Peirce, 
2007). The software selected the correct version of each trial based on the child’s 
condition and presented the video in the center of the television screen (each video 
measured 64 cm x 37 cm on screen).  
Stimuli 
 Picture-book Task. The stimuli used in the picture-book task were adapted from 
Rhodes and colleagues (2012). The book consisted of 16 illustrated pages (identical 
across conditions; see Figure 6 for example pages). Each page featured a person 
displaying a unique characteristic or property (see Table 1 for the full list of properties). 
The characters were diverse in terms of sex, ethnicity and age. Although no single 
clothing item was a defining feature of the characters, the characters wore category-
typical clothing that allowed for visual identification of the category. Each illustration 
was preceded by a page that had a statement that described the illustration. This statement 
varied based on the participant’s condition. In the generic statement condition, each 
statement about the novel social group was a generic statement (e.g., “Look at this 
Zarpie! Zarpies hate ice cream”). In the no-label condition, the statement described the 
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action on the page, but did not label the character as belonging to a social category (e.g., 
“Look at this one! This one hates ice cream”). 
The stimuli in Experiment 3 also included a paragraph designed to introduce 
parents to the content of the book. This paragraph was adapted from Experiment 3 of 
Rhodes and colleagues (2012) and was intended to induce parents to hold essentialist 
beliefs about Zarpies (see Appendix A). In this paragraph, Zarpie group members were 
described as highly similar to one another in terms of biology and cultural practices, but 
very different from other groups’ characteristics.  
Video Task. Stimuli consisted of digitized high-definition video recordings of 
actors performing a series of actions. In each trial, children saw an agent wearing an 
outfit similar to the characters featured in the picture-book task (i.e., khaki pants, a 
yellow long-sleeved shirt, and a blue hat). The videos featured four different agents; half 
of the agents were male, half were female. All children saw six test trials. A separate 
video was played for each trial. Each trial consisted of an initial phase followed by a final 
phase. The duration of the initial phase was fixed and identical for all participants. The 
duration of the final phase was child-controlled.  
Trials were arranged in three pairs. Each pair focused on one of the behaviors 
shown in the book. In one trial in each pair, the agent showed a behavior that was 
consistent with the Zarpie behavior depicted in the book. In the other trial in each pair, 
the agent displayed a behavior that was inconsistent with the Zarpie behavior depicted in 
the book (see Figure 7). All trials are described from the children’s perspective.  
In the first pair of test trials, children saw the Zarpie character either bounce a ball 
on their head (consistent-ball event) or bounce a ball on their knee (inconsistent event). 
During the 9-s initial phase of the consistent event, the male agent stood facing the 
camera, holding the ball out in front of him. He then raised the ball to his head and 
bounced the ball on his head twice, catching the ball each time. Then, with the ball in 
both hands he returned the ball to its initial starting position and paused. The children 
viewed this paused scene until the trial ended (see Procedure section for trial-ending 
criteria). The inconsistent event was identical, except that the Zarpie character bounced 
the ball on his knee instead of his head.  
In the second pair of trials, children saw the Zarpie character either hate ice cream 
(consistent event) or like ice cream (inconsistent event). During the 8-s initial phase of 
the consistent event, a female agent stood facing the camera. Positioned to her left was an 
ice cream cone on a small table. She reached over and grabbed the ice cream, raised it to 
her face, and pretended to taste the ice cream. Then, she moved the ice cream away from 
her while saying “Yuck!” and displaying negative affect to indicate that she disliked the 
ice cream. After repeating these actions once more, she placed the ice cream back on the 
table in its initial position, returned to her starting position, and paused. The children 
viewed this paused scene until the trial ended. The inconsistent event was identical, 
except that the Zarpie character said “Mmm!” and smiled displaying positive affect while 
tasting the ice cream.  
In the third pair of test trials, children saw the Zarpie character either flap their 
arms while happy (consistent event) or spin in circles (inconsistent event). During the 6-s 
initial phase of the consistent event, a male agent stood facing the camera. He then 
smiled, and with his arms placed outward, and moved his arms up and down twice. He 
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then paused with his arms at his side for 1-s and proceeded to repeat the arm flapping 
action. He then returned to his initial starting position and paused until the trial ended. 
The inconsistent event was identical except the male agent spun in circles instead of 
flapping his arms. The male agent spun in a circle twice, paused in a neutral position for 
1-s, and then repeated the spinning action. He then returned to a neutral position and 
paused. 
Procedure 
 Children played with toys in the lobby while their parent completed the consent 
form and MCDI-III. After completing the paperwork, parents were given the essentialist-
belief inducing paragraph to read. Immediately after the parent finished reading the 
paragraph, the parent and child were brought into an adjoining room where the child sat 
on their parent’s lap and completed the picture-book task. Immediately following the 
picture-book task, children went into a different adjoining room and participated in the 
video task. The duration of the entire study was approximately 30 minutes.  
 Picture-book task. Parents were asked to read the statements aloud and describe 
the pictures to their child as they would at home. The experimenter then left the parent 
and child in the room alone to complete the task. Parents were instructed to return to the 
lobby when they were finished.  
Video task. Immediately following the picture book task, children participated in 
a video task. At the start of the experiment, an attention-getter, a yellow smiley face 
measuring 28 x 20 cm, was presented in the center of the television screen. When the 
child attended to the screen, the experimenter initiated the presentation of the stimuli on 
the television screen. Children viewed the three pairs of test trials appropriate for their 
condition; half the children in each condition saw the consistent trial first and half saw an 
inconsistent test trial first. Each test trial ended when the child either (1) looked away for 
1 consecutive second after having looked for at least 5 cumulative seconds or (2) looked 
for 60 cumulative seconds without looking away for at least 1 consecutive second. 
After each trial, an attention-getting stimulus (a yellow smiley face measuring 28 
cm x 20 cm) was displayed on the screen for 4 seconds and a brief tone was played to 
attract the child’s attention back to the television screen. After trial 4, the smiley-face was 
replaced by an image of a baby (measuring 30 x 19cm) that was accompanied by a 4-s 
audio clip of a baby laughing.  
Coding 
 Picture-book Task. The picture-book task was coded and transcribed by naïve 
research assistants. Parent’s language was first transcribed verbatim. Non-verbal sounds 
or exclamations were not included in the transcription (e.g. gasps, sighs, groans, etc.). 
Children’s language was not transcribed. 
Following transcription, parent utterances were coded in several ways. First, we 
coded whether the utterance referred to a Zarpie characteristic and, if so, which 
characteristic it referred to. For each utterance about a Zarpie characteristic, we next 
coded whether the utterance fell into any of the following categories: generic, 
comparative, and contrastive. Generic statements were any statements that broadly 
described the category as a whole or made generalized statements about the behavior or 
characteristic, rather than describing particular group members. For example, “Those 
Zarpies hate ice cream” would be coded as a generic statement. Statements that 
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highlighted how the child displayed similar characteristics or behaviors to the characters 
in the book (e.g., “You like to flap your arms too, don’t you?”) were coded as 
comparative statements. Statements that highlighted how the child was different than the 
characters in the book (e.g., “You don’t hate ice cream, you love ice cream!”) were coded 
as contrastive statements.  
A second individual transcribed and coded 25% of the picture-book sessions. 
Cohen’s κ was calculated to determine agreement between the two coders. There was 
high agreement between the two coders for all categories of statements, all κ > .81, all p 
< .001.  
In order to control for differences in parent verbosity, parental statements about 
each characteristic displayed in the book (e.g., bouncing a ball) were converted to a 
percentage by taking the raw number of parental statements about that characteristic and 
dividing by the total number of parental utterances. To capture parents’ general tendency 
to engage in a particular type of talk, generic, contrastive, and comparative statements 
were also converted to a percentage by taking the raw number of the parental statements 
in a particular statement-type category (e.g., generic statements), and dividing by the total 
number of parental statements.  
Video Task. In order to present events with trial duration contingent on the 
children’s attention, online coding was conducted by the experimenter (blind to condition 
and test trial), as described above. All children were then coded offline from silent video 
by a trained coder who was naïve to the condition and the order of the test trials that the 
child received; the looking times resulting from this coding were used in all analyses. For 
each trial, the coder indicated the child’s direction of gaze (at the stimuli or away) for 
each frame of the video. Another trained coder who was naïve to the child’s condition 
and order of the test trials coded all sessions. The two offline coder’s agreed on the 
child’s direction of gaze for 96% of video frames. Trials in which agreement between the 
two coders was less than 90% (22/186) or the two coders disagreed on whether the child 
met the criteria to end the trial (7/186) were resolved by a third coder. With the exception 
of 12 trials in which the third coder agreed with the second coder, the primary coder’s 
data were used in all analyses. 
For some trials, both offline coders agreed that the online coder terminated the 
trial prematurely before the child met the looking criteria (25 out of 378 trials). When this 
occurred, both trials for the affected item (i.e. ball, ice cream, or flap/spin) were 
eliminated from the analyses. Individual items were also eliminated if the difference 
between participants’ looking times to the inconsistent and consistent events was more 
than 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean of the condition (4 items). Finally, one 
item was excluded because the participant looked the maximum amount of time in both 
trials. Children were excluded if they failed to contribute at least two useable items to the 
analysis. The final sample consisted of 26 ball items, 30 ice cream items, and 25 flap/spin 
items in the generic condition and 26 ball items, 30 ice cream items and 25 flap/spin 
items in the no-label condition.  
Children were highly attentive during the initial phase of each test trial, attending, 
on average, for 95% (ball trials), 98% (ice cream trials), and 93% (flap/spin trials) of the 
initial phases, respectively. Children’s looking times to final paused scenes were 
calculated for each event. We then calculated a difference-score for each item by 
   
24 
subtracting children’s looking time to the consistent event from their looking time to the 
inconsistent event for that item. The difference scores were then averaged across all three 
items to create an overall difference score for each participant. 
Preliminary analyses of participants’ overall difference scores indicated no 
significant interactions of sex or order with condition, all Fs < 1.82, ps > .18. The data 
were therefore collapsed across these factors in subsequent analyses.  
Results and Discussion 
Children’s overall difference scores were analyzed using an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with condition (generic, no-label) as a between-subjects factor. There was a 
main effect of condition, F(1, 61) = 6.93, p = .011, ηp2 = .10. One-sample t-tests revealed 
that in the generic condition, children’s overall difference scores were significantly 
different from chance (0) (M = 3.49, SD = 6.42), t(31) = 3.08, p = .004, d = 1.11. In the 
non-generic condition, children’s overall difference scores were not significantly 
different from chance (M = -0.4, SD = 5.24), t < 1. As shown in Figure 8, in the generic 
condition, all of the items had positive difference scores, indicating that children looked 
longer at the Zarpie-inconsistent events. In contrast, no such pattern emerged in the non-
generic condition.   
 These results suggest that children in the generic condition learned something 
about how Zarpies typically behave from a brief interaction with their parent, and 
expected that a novel Zarpie in the video task would behave in a manner that was 
consistent with the Zarpie behavior depicted in the book. This pattern of learning was not 
present in the no-label condition. Overall, these results suggest that exposure to generic 
sentences increased children’s tendency to view Zarpies a coherent group that had 
members that were highly similar to one another.  
In the next set of analyses we investigated whether, above and beyond the 
sentences in the book, any other dimensions of parents’ talk differed across conditions. 
The percentage of parental utterances about each item in the video task (ball, ice cream, 
flap/spin) were entered into a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with 
condition (generic, no-label) as a between-subjects factor (see Table 2). There was no 
effect of condition, F < 1, suggesting that the amount of talk about the specific items did 
not differ across conditions.  
We next examined whether the way in which parents talked about Zarpies 
differed across conditions. Independent-samples t-tests revealed that the percentage of 
utterances containing generic statements (excluding the generic statements that were 
written in the book) was significantly higher in the generic condition (M = 1.49, SD = 
1.89) than in the no-label condition (M = .24, SD = 1.02), t(61) = 3.27, p = .002, d = .82. 
Similarly, the percentage of parental utterances containing comparative statements was 
significantly higher in the generic condition (M = 1.90, SD = 1.90) than in the no-label 
condition (M = .85, SD = 1.26), t(61) = 2.58, p = .012, d = .65. The percentage of parental 
utterances containing contrastive statements was also marginally higher in the generic 
condition (M = 2.36, SD = 3.23) than in the no-label condition (M = 1.15, SD = 1.81), 
t(61) = 1.83, p = .073, d = .46. Together, these findings suggest that parents who received 
the generic statements in the picture-book task spontaneously produced more generic 
statements, above and beyond the book sentences that were provided to them. These 
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parents also highlighted similarities and differences between the child and the Zarpies 
more often than parents who did not receive the generic statements.  
Next, we examined whether individual differences in parental talk contributed to 
children’s performance in the video task using a series of multi-level mixed-effect 
models. The lmer function of the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 
2015) was utilized using the statistical software RStudio (R Core Team, 2015). The 
children’s difference scores for each test item were entered into two multi-level mixed-
effects models with random effects for subjects (Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008). The 
first model represented the Null model and did not contain the fixed effect of interest. 
The second model was identical except that it included a fixed factor of interest. The two 
models were compared using -2 log-likelihood ratio tests. 
We analyzed children’s difference scores with 4 different models, each of which 
included one of the following parent-talk scores as a fixed effect: (1) percentage of 
utterances that contained talk about each item in the video task, (2) the percentage 
utterances that contained generic statements, (3) the percentage of utterances that 
contained comparative statements, and (4) the percentage of utterances that contained 
contrastive statements.  In each case, the model was compared to a null model without 
the parental talk variable of interest. No significant effects were found, all χ2  < 1, ps > .5. 
These findings suggest that these types of parental talk did not influence children’s 
performance in the video task, above and beyond the sentences included in the book. 
However, many parents made these types of statements infrequently, or not at all, and 
thus there were many zero scores for these categories. It is possible that with a larger 
sample, or a larger sample of talk from each parent, that we would see significant effects 
of these types of parent talk.   
General Discussion 
 
The current study examined how children may learn about social groups in their 
environment through one proximal environmental influence, parental talk. Parents first 
read an essentialist-belief inducing paragraph that introduced them to the novel social 
group called Zarpies, and discussed how Zarpies members had very similar 
characteristics, but very different characteristics from members of other social groups. 
Parents then read a picturebook to their child that depicted Zarpie characters engaging in 
a variety of activities; the book either contained generic sentences or no generic 
sentences. Following the picture book task, children participated in a video task where 
they were shown individuals dressed as Zarpies display behaviors that were either 
consistent or inconsistent with the Zarpie behaviors depicted in the book. Children that 
received the generic sentences in the book expected the Zarpie characters in the video 
task to behave in a Zarpie-consistent manner, and looked longer in the video task if the 
Zarpie characters displayed Zarpie-inconsistent behaviors instead. This pattern of 
learning was not observed when children received the no-label sentences: children 
instead looked equally to the Zarpie-consistent and -inconsistent behaviors.  
These results provide the first evidence that toddlers can learn about social groups 
present in their environment from a brief parental interaction. After parents read the 16 
generic statements provided in the book to their child, children in the generic statement 
condition formed an expectation that Zarpie members would be similar to one another 
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and display the same types of behaviors. This suggests that, from little environmental 
input, children can learn which groups are likely to be essentialized. That is, they can 
learn which groups will likely have individuals that share stable, inherent characteristics 
that make individuals in the group similar to one another, but different than other groups. 
Children can then use this information to guide their expectations about the 
characteristics of social groups.  
These findings also provide the first evidence that generic statements can impact 
the beliefs and expectations that children form about social categories at even younger 
ages than have previously been examined. Although previous studies have found that 
parents produce generic statements with children as young as 2 in reference to animal and 
artifact categories (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, 
Ware, Kleinberg, Manczak, & Stilwell, 2014; Pappas & Gelman, 1998), research has yet 
to examine how exposing children to these statements directly impacts children’s beliefs 
and expectations about social categories.  
The fact that hearing these generic statements impacted the beliefs children 
formed about Zarpies is especially impressive given that generic statements are a 
sophisticated, abstract aspect of language. Because generic statements can be expressed 
in many ways, the linguistic markers of generic statements are rather ambiguous. For 
instance, “The dog likes to dig”, “Dogs play fetch”, and “A dog is a man’s best friend” 
are all examples of generic statements. Yet, highly similar statements such as, “The dog 
dug up the backyard”, “Dogs are playing fetch in the park”, and “A dog ate my 
homework” are non-generic statements. Thus, identifying a generic statement, and its 
potential meaning, requires some understanding of morphosyntactic cues (Gelman, 2004; 
Gelman & Raman, 2003). In addition, generic statements are conceptually abstract. For 
example, it is impossible to observe an entire kind (e.g., dogs) in the environment. 
Instead, one can only observe particular exemplars of a kind (e.g., a dog/dogs). Thus, in 
order to determine what a generic statement refers to, one must make an inferential leap 
(Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008). Despite these complexities, results from the 
current study suggest that young children detect this type of language in their 
environment, and that these statements have a powerful impact on children’s social-group 
based reasoning.  
Children’s understanding and production of generic statements from a young age 
may suggest that thinking in terms of categories may be privileged in children’s thinking 
about the social world. Although the social world can be carved up in an infinite amount 
of ways, this linguistic cue may signal to children meaningful categories in the 
environment, and cause children to attend to the features of the category that may mark 
group membership. Children can then use this information to make inductive inferences 
about the likely properties of a group. 
In the current study, all parents were given the same essentialist-belief inducing 
paragraph. Yet, it is clear that the presence of the generic statements in the generic 
statement condition affected the parents’ language and behaviors in the picture-book task. 
Parents in the generic statement condition produced more generic (above and beyond the 
statements provided), comparative, and contrastive statements than parents in the no-label 
condition. Parents in both picture-book conditions talked about each of the items in the 
video task equally. Thus, it is not the case that parents in the generic condition merely 
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produced more statements about a particular item. Instead, it may be that the mere 
presence of the generic statements in the picture book caused parents to spontaneously 
hold stronger essentialist beliefs than parents in the no-label condition, and thus produce 
more statements that highlighted how Zarpie members a part of a unique, coherent group 
whose members are highly similar to one another. These findings support theoretical 
claims that subtle environmental factors, such as functional use of group labels, implicit 
or explicit labeling (Bigler & Liben, 2007), or even the statements in a children’s book, 
may influence the particular beliefs that parents form about a particular social group, in 
turn impacting the type of language their child hears and the social-group based beliefs 
their child forms.  
However, the current study did not find that other types of parental input (i.e., 
generic, comparative, and contrastive statements) predicted children’s learning about the 
Zarpie characteristics. One reason for this may be that parents produced these types of 
statements in low percentages, or in some cases not at all. Previous research has found 
that in picture-book reading contexts, up to 3% of parental utterances contained generic 
statements (Gelman & Raman, 2003). Although this is a larger percentage than observed 
in the current study, it is still a relatively low percentage. It is possible that these other 
types of statements do in fact influence children’s social-group based beliefs, but in order 
to detect these effects we would need more observations.  
In summary, the findings from the current study suggest that children can learn 
about the characteristics of a novel social group from brief parental interaction, and form 
expectations about the characteristics of social group members based on this input. These 
findings highlight the powerful impact local environmental influences have on the 
formation of children’s social-group based beliefs.  
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Chapter 4 
By preschool age, children demonstrate essentialist beliefs about social 
categories: children believe members of a social category will share deep, inherent 
natures and that members of a category will be similar to one another in both obvious and 
nonobvious ways. This can lead to generalizing prior knowledge about a category to 
novel entities and situations (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). For example, by age 4, 
American children essentialize gender, predicting that a baby born as a boy will 
inevitably grow up to demonstrate male-typical characteristics (e.g., liking football), 
despite environmental influences (e.g., growing up on an island of women that liked 
ballet; Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2009).  
Although the tendency to use social-group membership to predict others’ 
characteristics is well established by preschool (e.g., Gelman, 2003), the specific 
inferences that children make about social groups, and the attributes children attend to 
when making these inferences, vary with age and culture (for a review, see Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017). For example, essentialist beliefs about gender in US children 
living in a liberal community declined with age, whereas essentialist beliefs about gender 
did not decline in children from a more conservative community (Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009). Additionally, 5- and 7-year-old White children from both urban and rural areas of 
the US do not initially use race as a basis to draw inferences about the characteristics of 
others. Instead, children gradually begin to use race as a basis for inference as they get 
older (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  
Although previous studies have focused on individual social categories (e.g., 
Diesendruck & Halevi, 2006; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), typically people belong to 
multiple social categories simultaneously (e.g., a Christian female). Recent evidence from 
studies using forced-choice inferences tasks suggest that the particular categories that 
children attend to when an individual belongs to multiple social groups vary with culture 
as well. In these tasks, an experimenter first introduces children to two test characters, 
each of which belongs to two social groups (e.g., an Arabic boy and a Jewish girl). The 
experimenter introduces each test character, labels both of the characters’ social groups, 
and provides a novel fact about the character (e.g., “This is a boy. He is Arabic. He wants 
to be a Mashitz when he grows up; “This is a girl. She is Jewish. She wants to be a 
Nagim when she grows up.”). Then, the experimenter introduces a target character that 
matches one social category of each test character (e.g., “Look at this girl. She is a girl 
like this girl. She is Arabic like this boy”). After labeling the target character’s social 
categories, the experimenter asks the child which test character the target is most similar 
to.  
In one recent study, Birnbaum and colleagues (2010) used this force-choice 
inference task to examine the inductive inferences made by 5- to 11-year-old children in 
Israel (Birnbaum, et al., 2010). The task involved three social categories: ethnicity 
(Jewish, Arabic), religiosity (religious, secular) and gender (boy, girl). Children tended to 
select the test character that matched the target character’s ethnicity as opposed to the 
target character’s religiosity or gender. This suggests that in Israel, children are more 
likely to base their inferences on ethnicity information than on religion or gender 
information. This was especially true of religious Jewish children, who chose the 
ethnicity match at higher rates than either secular Jewish children or Muslim Arab
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children in Israel. In contrast, Smyth and colleagues (2017) found that when 6- to 11-
year-olds in Northern Ireland were tested with a similar forced-choice inference task, 
they preferentially based their inferences on religion (Catholic/Protestant) over other 
social categories (Smyth et al., 2017).  
The contrast in findings between these two studies demonstrates that culture 
influences the particular social categories a child uses when making inductive inferences 
about the characteristics of a novel individual. One reason that children in Israel may 
base their inductive inferences on ethnicity over other social categories is because 
categories tied to ethnicity are highly salient in Israel. Ethnicity categories such as “Arab” 
and “Jewish” may be especially salient to Israeli children because these categories are 
unavoidably tied to historic, violent conflicts that have happened in Israel.  These ethnic 
categories are often highlighted in Israeli media and school materials (Bar-Tal & 
Teichman, 2005). Similarly, social categories based on religion are particularly salient to 
children in Northern Ireland due to historic, violent political conflicts dating back 
centuries. To this day, membership in a particular religious category such as “Catholic” 
or “Protestant” is a critically important dimension in Northern Ireland (Gillespie, 2010), 
and Northern Irish communities are subject to residential (Lloyd & Shuttleworth, 2012), 
martial (Lloyd & Robinson, 2011), and educational segregation (Gallagher, 2010) based 
on religious affiliation.  
Further evidence suggests that even within a given culture, local differences in the 
contexts that children experience can impact the inferences that they draw about social 
categories. Children in Israel who attend bicultural schools (half of the students in each 
class are Arabic and half are Jewish) are less likely to make inductive inferences based on 
ethnicity than children who attend mono-cultural schools that are predominantly one 
ethnicity (Deeb, Segall, Birnbaum, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2011; Smyth et al., 
2017). Smyth and colleagues (2017) found a similar pattern in Northern Ireland: children 
attending diverse religious schools with both Protestant and Catholic children were less 
likely to base their inferences on religion than children attending mono-religion schools. 
Together, these findings suggest that exposure to social diversity, and intergroup contact 
where children regularly encounter members of contrasting social categories, such as 
multiple different religions, decreases the likelihood that children will use that particular 
social category as a basis of inductive inference.  
The environment of children growing up in the United States (US) differs from 
that of children in Israel and Ireland in several ways that might influence children’s 
social-group based inferences. First, in the United States, social categories based on 
ethnicity and religion are not as historically charged as in Israel and Northern Ireland, 
respectively, and thus it is likely that these categories are less salient to American 
children. Second, many children in the US experience environments that are diverse with 
respect to religion and ethnicity. These environmental contexts may be more reflective of 
the integrated schools in Israel and Ireland. This leads to the prediction that children in 
the US should be unlikely to use religion and ethnicity as a basis for inductive inferences 
about others’ characteristics.  
Yet, few studies have investigated the relative inductive potential of social 
categories in the US, and the studies that have investigated this question have focused 
largely on gender and race (e.g., Shutts et al., 2013). Thus, the extent to which children in 
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the US use ethnicity and religion to make inductive inferences remains unclear. To my 
knowledge, there has been no research on how children in the US reason about ethnicity, 
and only one study that investigated how US children reason about religion (Smyth et al., 
2017). This study found that 6- to 10-year-old children in the Boston area were no more 
likely to base inductive inferences on religion (Protestant/Catholic) than on pet ownership 
(goldfish/hamster owner). This study provides preliminary support for the prediction that 
children in the US do not readily make inferences based on religion.   
However, this small amount of research on children’s reasoning about religion 
categories, as well as the studies investigating children’s reasoning about race and gender 
categories in the US, have tended to focus on upper-middle class White urban samples 
(Shutts et al., 2013; Smyth et al., 2017). The findings described above show that even 
within a country, children’s inferences can differ based on local environmental context 
(e.g., Deeb et al., 2011; Smyth et al., 2017). Similarly, even within the US, children’s 
beliefs about gender have been shown to differ across rural and urban environments 
(Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). It is therefore important to examine how children use social 
categories to make inductive inferences in a different sample that is more ethnically, 
economically, and culturally diverse.  
The goal of the present study was thus to examine how US children growing up in 
a diverse context reason about ethnicity and religion. In order to facilitate comparisons 
with other studies conducted in the US, we also investigated how children reason about 
gender. To address this question, 5- to 6-year-old children were tested with a forced-
choice inference task adapted from Birnbaum et al. (2010). This age sample was chosen 
to be similar to the previous studies that have been conducted on this topic, and to 
investigate whether children’s inferences change as a function of age.  
The current sample was recruited from the San Joaquin Valley (a rural, 
agricultural region with high levels of cultural, ethnic, and economic diversity). Thus, our 
sample is more culturally, ethnically, and economically diverse than prior studies that 
have investigated this topic in the US. More importantly, this area tends not to be highly 
segregated. Prior findings that children in religiously or ethnically integrated schools pay 
less attention to religion (Smyth et al., 2017) and ethnicity (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb 
et al., 2011), respectively, suggests that being in an integrated environment may reduce 
one’s attention to a particular social dimension. Therefore, children in our sample may be 
less likely to attend to categories such as religion and ethnicity. Additionally, prior 
findings suggest that children in the US attend to gender from an early age (Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009). In our study, we expect that children will be less likely to attend to 
religion and ethnicity than children in Northern Ireland or Israel, and instead will robustly 
attend to gender when making inductive inferences. However, because children’s 
reasoning about gender and race changes with age (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), it is 
possible that these patterns will change as children become older.  
Experiment 4 
Method  
Participants. 32 5-year-old children (57.30 — 71.72 months; M = 66.34 months; 
16 female) and 32 6-year-old children (72.1 — 83.9 months, M = 78.21 months; 16 
female) participated in the study. This sample size was selected based on previous studies 
using a similar method (i.e. Birnbaum et al., 2010). An additional 10 children were tested 
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(8 5-year-olds, 2 6-year-olds), but were excluded due to an experimenter error (1), 
because the child asked to stop participating (1), or because they were missing a response 
on at least 1 trial3 (8).   
The children’s names were obtained from a database of parents who had 
previously expressed interest in participating in research studies with their children. 
Parents were offered reimbursement for their transportation expenses, and their child was 
given a book for participating. Parents provided written informed consent for their child’s 
participation. The Institutional Review Board at University of California, Merced 
approved all procedures. 
The racial and ethnic composition of the 5-year-old participants in the final 
sample was 72% Caucasian, and 3% American Indian or Alaska Native. An additional 
13% chose ‘other race’, 9% selected more than one race, and 3% chose not to respond. 
50% of the sample identified as Hispanic or Latino, 47% identified as not Hispanic or 
Latino, and 3% chose not respond. In lieu of income information, we recorded the highest 
level of education reported by either parent: 19% completed high school, 16% completed 
an Associate’s Degree, 31% completed a Bachelor’s degree, 19% completed a Master’s 
degree, and 16% completed a professional degree.  
The racial and ethnic composition of the 6-year-old participants in the final 
sample was 47% Caucasian, 6% Asian, 3% American Indian or Alaska Native, 6% Black 
or African-American; an additional 25% chose ‘other race’, 7% selected more than one 
race, and 6% chose not to respond. 59% of the sample identified as Hispanic or Latino, 
35% identified as not Hispanic or Latino, and 6% chose not respond. Thirty-seven 
percent of parents completed high school, 16% completed an Associate’s Degree, 28% 
completed a Bachelor’s degree, 13% completed a Master’s degree, and 6% completed a 
professional degree.  
Stimuli. Stimuli included 36 pictures taken from the “Child Affective Facial 
Expression (CAFE) set” by LoBue and Thrasher (2015). The pictures showed 4- to 6-
year-old children’s faces displaying happy expressions (see Figure 9). Each picture was 
3” x 3”, printed on cardstock, and laminated. The stimuli varied in gender and ethnicity. 
Half of the stimuli were male and half were female. Half of the stimuli were Hispanic and 
half were non-Hispanic.  
Apparatus and Procedure. The duration of the entire study was approximately 
30 minutes. Children played with toys in the lobby while their parent completed the 
consent form and a vocabulary checklist (see Appendix B). The vocabulary checklist 
included ethnicity (White, Latino, Mexican, Hispanic) and religion words (Protestant, 
Catholic, Christian, Jewish). Parents were asked to indicate whether their child knew any 
of the words.  
The children and their parents were then brought into an adjoining room. Children 
were seated at a 42” x 24” table. An experimenter sat directly next to them on their left-
hand side. The parent sat behind the experimenter and child. A camera next to the table 
captured the presentation of the stimuli and children’s responses.  
                                                
3 Analysis including partial data from these 8 participants did not change any of the 
interpretations of the data discussed below. 
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Children completed 12 trials. In each trial, children were shown a triad of stimuli 
(see Figure 9 for example triad). Each triad featured two test characters and a target 
character. Each of the test characters belonged to one of the same social categories as the 
target character, but was different from the target character on the other social category. 
On each trial, the experimenter placed the first test character approximately 10 inches in 
front of the child. The experimenter then labeled the character’s social categories (e.g., 
“The child is Jewish. He is a boy”). The experimenter then provided a novel fact about 
the character (e.g., “This Jewish boy likes to play a game called gorp”). This procedure 
was then repeated with the second test character: the picture was placed 7.5 inches to the 
right or left side of the first picture (counterbalanced), the experimenter labeled the 
character’s social groups and provided a novel fact about the character (e.g., “This child 
is Christian. She is a girl. This Christian girl likes to play a game called zool”). Finally, 
the target character was placed centered approximately 4 inches below the test characters. 
The experimenter labeled the target character’s social categories, noting the similarity 
with the relevant test character (e.g., “Look at this child. She is Jewish like this child. She 
is a girl like this child.”). The experimenter then asked the child which test character the 
target character would share characteristics with (the test prompt; e.g., “Does she like to 
play a game called gorp like him? Or does she like to play a game called zool like her?”). 
The experimenter pointed to each test character as she was labeling them. When 
introducing the target character, the experimenter said, “Look at this child”. Then, the 
experimenter labeled the test character’s social categories and pointed to the test 
character that matched the social category being labeled.   
If the child did not respond to the test prompt, or pointed to the target character, 
the experimenter told the child “there are no right or wrong answers, it is okay to guess” 
up to 2 additional times, pausing approximately 3 seconds after each question. In order to 
ensure accuracy in recording children’s responses, if the child responded verbally the 
experimenter would ask the child to point to the picture. If the child never responded, the 
experimenter moved onto the next trial.  
Children viewed three types of triads: gender/ethnicity, gender/religion, and 
religion/ethnicity. We focused on these particular social categories in order to compare 
the findings with prior studies (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Smyth et 
al., 2017). The social category labels included in the study were boy/girl, Mexican/White, 
and Christian/Jewish. We conducted a pilot study to determine the ethnic and religion 
labels that children in this area might have been exposed to. Twelve parents were asked 
to indicate whether their 4- to 6-year-old child knew any of the following words: 
Protestant, Christian, Catholic, Latino, Mexican, Hispanic. Out of the list of words, 50% 
of children knew the word Christian, 17% of children knew the word Catholic, 0% knew 
the word Protestant, 58% knew the word Mexican, 17% knew the word Hispanic, and 0% 
of children knew the word Latino. Because children were unfamiliar with most of the 
religion terms, we decided to use the word Jewish as a comparison to the religion term 
Christian, which children were familiar with. Additionally, although Mexican is not an 
ethnicity, local children were not familiar with Latino or Hispanic, so we used the term 
that was more familiar to the children.  
Novel properties included preferences (e.g., likes to play a game called 
gorp/zool;), beliefs (e.g., believes that feps/wugs live in trees;), biology (e.g., has blood 
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type zid/seb), and future occupation aspirations (e.g., wants to be a zagor/dunkel when 
s/he grows up; see Appendix C for a full list of novel properties). These categories of 
novel properties were the same as in Birnbaum et al. (2010).  
On trials where gender was not relevant (i.e., ethnicity/religion trials), gender was 
held constant. On two of the ethnicity/religion trials, the stimuli were all boys, and on the 
other two trials the stimuli were all girls. On trials where ethnicity was not relevant (i.e. 
gender/religion trials), it was held constant: on two trials the stimuli were all Hispanic, 
and on the other two trials the stimuli were all White.  
Four different randomized orders were created with the constraints that the same 
triad type was not repeated consecutively, questions based on the same novel property did 
not occur consecutively, and the test character was not placed on the same side (right or 
left) more than twice consecutively. For a given trial, the test character that was placed 
first and the social group label that was provided first were counterbalanced across 
orders.  
Coding. All children were coded offline by a primary and secondary coder, unless 
parental consent was not given for the session to be recorded. In this circumstance, the 
experimenter coded the child’s responses during the task, and no secondary coding was 
completed. This only occurred for one participant.  
For each trial the coder indicated the child’s choice after the test prompt. To 
ensure accuracy in children’s responses, only pointing towards, or physically touching 
the stimuli were counted as a response. The two coders agreed on all children’s test 
prompt choices. Two measures were calculated: (1) the number of times the child picked 
a particular social category on each social comparison type (e.g., how many times the 
child picked ethnicity over gender on the ethnicity vs. gender social comparison) as well 
as (2) the total number of times the child picked ethnicity, gender, and religion across all 
social comparison types (total scores). 
Results 
First, children’s performance as a combined group was examined. To investigate 
children’s relative use of social categories when making inductive inferences, chi-square 
analyses were conducted to assess children’s distribution of responses. A separate 
analysis was conducted for each triad type. For each triad type, we designated one of the 
two categories as the reference category (i.e. gender for the gender/religion trials) and 
calculated the number of children who selected that reference category on all four trials, 
three trials, two trials, one trial, or none of the trials. For instance, we counted the number 
of children out of the total 64 who on the gender/religion trials picked the gender match 
on all, three, two, one or none of the trials. The resulting distribution was compared to the 
distribution that would be expected by chance (four trials: 6.25%; three trials: 25%; two 
trials: 37.5%; one trial: 25%; and zero trials: 6.25%).  
 On the gender/religion triads, the distribution of responses differed significantly 
from chance, χ2 (4, N = 64) = 11.06, p =.026, with children selecting gender more than 
religion (see Table 3). Ten children selected gender on all four trials, whereas only two 
children selected religion on all four trials. On the ethnicity/religion triads, the 
distribution of responses did not differ from chance, χ2 (4, N = 64) = 6.20, p = .18, but 
there was a numeric trend for children to select ethnicity more than religion. On the 
gender/ethnicity triads, the distribution of responses did not differ from chance, χ2 (4, N = 
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64) = 5.75, p = .22, but there was a numeric trend for children to select gender more than 
ethnicity.   
This pattern of findings is broadly consistent with the initial predictions outlined 
in the introduction. As predicted, children did not demonstrate a clear focus on ethnicity 
(unlike children in Israel) or religion (unlike children in Northern Ireland) in their 
choices. The only significant effect that was found was for children to favor gender, as 
originally predicted. However, this only held true on the gender/religion triads. 
Surprisingly, children were not significantly more likely to pick gender on the 
gender/ethnicity triads as originally predicted. One possibility is that this reflects an age 
effect, with five- and six-year-olds differing in their attention to these social categories. 
Previous research conducted in the US has shown that in some environments, children’s 
tendency to use gender when making inductive inferences changes with age (e.g., Rhodes 
& Gelman, 2009). It is therefore possible that children’s attention to the categories tested 
here also differed with age, leading to this mixed pattern of results. To examine this 
possibility, we investigated whether children’s pattern of responses differed across the 
two age groups.  
Children’s total scores for each social category (gender, ethnicity, religion) were 
entered into a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with age group (5-years-old, 
6-year-olds) as a between-subjects factor. The overall MANOVA revealed a marginal 
effect of age, F(1, 61) = 2.52 p = .089, ηp2 = .08. In particular, age-group had a 
significant effect on children’s selection of ethnicity, F(1, 62) = 5.07 p = .028, ηp2 = .08: 
6-year-olds (M = 4.34, SD = 1.26) were more likely to select ethnicity than were 5-year-
olds (M = 3.53, SD = 1.61).  
Given this effect of age, we next examined each age group separately. Chi-square 
analyses conducted on 5-year-olds distribution of responses on each triad type revealed 
that children’s responses deviated from chance for the two triad types involving gender. 
In particular, on the gender/religion triads, the distribution of responses differed 
significantly from chance χ2 (4, N = 32) = 13.68, p = .008, with children selecting gender 
more than religion. Similarly, on the gender/ethnicity triads, the distribution of responses 
was marginally different from chance χ2 (4, N = 32) = 9.40, p = .052, with more children 
selecting gender than ethnicity. Five-year-olds’ distribution of choices did not differ on 
the religion/ethnicity triads, χ2 (4, N = 32) = .94, p = .92, suggesting they picked these 
categories equally.  
In contrast, 6-year-olds distribution of responses only deviated from chance on the 
religion/ethnicity triads, χ2 (4, N = 32) = 12.02, p = .017, with children selecting ethnicity 
more than religion. Six-year-olds’ distribution of responses did not significantly differ 
from chance on the gender/ethnicity triads, χ2 (4, N = 32) = 4.60, p = .33 or the 
gender/religion triads, χ2 (4, N = 32) = 1.70, p = .79, suggesting that children selected 
each of the social categories equally on these triads.  
This pattern of results suggests two age-related changes in children’s tendency to 
use various social categories when making inductive inferences. First, at age 5, children 
were equally likely to base their inferences on religion and ethnicity. However, at age 6, 
children were significantly more likely to base their inferences on ethnicity. In 
combination with the finding that children were more likely to base their inferences on 
gender than ethnicity at age 5, but not at age 6, these findings suggest that children’s 
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tendency to base their inductive inferences on ethnicity is increasing across the age 
groups. Second, we found that children were more likely to base their inferences on 
gender than religion at age 5, but not at age 6. In combination with the finding that 
children’s tendency to base their inferences on ethnicity increases across the age groups, 
these findings suggests that children’s tendency to base their inferences on gender 
decreases across the age groups.  
These results suggest an age-related change in how children reason about social 
groups. However, an alternative possibility is that these findings reflect other differences 
between the two groups. For instance, one factor that might influence children’s 
responses is children’s knowledge of the various ethnicity and religion terms that were 
used in the study. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the average 
number of ethnicity words used in the study that 5- and 6-year old children knew, as 
reported by the parent. The two age groups did not differ on their knowledge of ethnicity 
words, t < 1, or religion words, t < 1. Thus, the pattern of results is not likely due to 
children’s differential comprehension of the words across age groups.  
Another potential factor that may have influenced the pattern of results was 
parents’ level of education. Prior research has found that children’s conceptions of social 
categories such as gender and race differed across rural, politically conservative 
communities with lower levels of education and urban, liberal communities with higher 
levels of education (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). This raises the possibility that parental 
education could influence the pattern of results in the current study. To analyze whether 
parents’ level of education differed across the two age groups, parents’ level of education 
was recoded on a four-point scale: high school (1), associates degree (2), bachelors 
degree (3), and master’s or professional degree (4). An independent samples t-test 
comparing parents’ average level of education across age groups revealed there was a 
trend for the 5-year-old children’s parents to be more educated (M = 2.81, SD = 1.12) 
than the 6-year-old children’s parents (M = 2.28, SD = 1.17), t(62) = 1.86, p = .07. We 
next examined whether this education difference contributed to the differing pattern of 
responses across age groups. Five- and 6-year-old children’s total scores for each social 
category (gender, ethnicity, religion) were entered into a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) with parent’s highest level of education, and age group (5-years-old, 6-
years-old) as between-subjects factors. There was a marginal main effect of age, F(1, 55) 
= 2.55 p = .09, ηp2 = .15. No other effects were significant, both Fs < 1.18, ps > .32. The 
absence of any effects or interactions involving parental education suggest that the 
difference between the two age groups is not a product of the marginal differences in 
parental education between the two groups. This finding suggests that parents’ level of 
education did not influence the pattern of results seen in Experiment 44.  
General Discussion 
 
 The current study sought to examine how children in a diverse area of the US use 
religion, ethnicity, and gender when reasoning about the characteristics of others. 
                                                
4 An additional analysis found no significant effects of the child’s ethnicity (Non-
Hispanic White or Other) on children’s responses. 
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Children participated in a forced-choice inference task where they were shown 12 triads 
of pictures of children; each triad consisted of two test characters from two different 
social categories (e.g., Jewish boy, Christian girl) and a target character that belonged to 
one of the same social categories as each test character (e.g., a Christian boy). Children 
were told novel facts about each of the test characters, and were asked which test 
character the target character would be most similar to. Children saw three different 
social comparisons (ethnicity/gender, gender/religion, ethnicity/religion). At age 5, 
children relied on gender over religion or ethnicity when making inductive inferences 
about the characteristics of novel individuals. The tendency to use gender was reduced at 
age 6, where children instead demonstrated an increased tendency to base their inferences 
on ethnicity. Similar to the 5-year-olds, 6-year-olds were unlikely to make inductive 
inferences based on religion.   
The current study found that at age 5, children tend to use gender as a basis for 
their inductive inferences over other social categories. The observed pattern of findings is 
consistent with a number of existing findings that have found that gender is highly salient 
to children from a young age, and that children tend to focus on this social category when 
making inductive inferences about the characteristics of others (e.g., Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009). In the current study, children’s tendency to use gender when making inductive 
inferences decreased from age 5 to age 6. This age transition is similar to what has been 
found with children from urban areas of the US (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Smyth et al., 
2017), where children initially use gender as a basis for inferences, but over time use 
other social categories. This similarity is interesting, given that the current sample is, 
overall, more rural, more politically conservative, and less educated than the urban 
sample used in Rhodes and Gelman (2009). In more rural, conservative areas, children’s 
use of gender when making inductive inferences does not decrease with age (Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009). Future work is needed to investigate which aspects of children’s 
environments, and potential local environmental differences, might influence children’s 
attention to gender. 
Consistent with our predictions, 5- and 6-year-olds in the current study did not 
base their inferences on religion. At age 5, children were never more likely to base their 
inferences on religion over other social categories, demonstrating that religion is not 
salient to children at this age. Further, the total number of times children picked religion 
(out of 8 trials) did not significantly change from age 5 (M = 3.63) to age 6 (M = 3.25), 
suggesting that children as a group are not shifting as group to thinking that religion is 
highly important for basing their inductive inferences from age 5 to age 6. These findings 
are similar to what has been found with children growing up in Boston, where children do 
not use religion significantly more than other social categories with making inductive 
inferences (Smyth et al., 2017). Yet, this pattern of results is different than what has been 
found with children in Northern Ireland, where children find religion categories highly 
salient and use them to make inductive inferences. The difference in findings between 
children in the US and Northern Ireland could reflect the fact that religion is less salient 
to children in the US, that areas in the US do not have historical conflicts based on 
religion and are not typically segregated by religion, or potentially both.  
A somewhat complex pattern of findings emerged for children’s use of ethnicity 
when making inductive inferences. At age 5, children did not base their inductive 
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inferences on ethnicity. This result contrasts with the findings with children from Israel, 
where children this age tend to base their inferences on ethnicity than other social 
categories, and supports our prediction that ethnicity is less salient in US children’s 
environments. In countries such as Israel where ethnicity categories are tied to historic, 
violent conflicts, these categories may become salient to children at a young age. Social 
categories based on ethnicity may not be as salient to the children from diverse areas in 
the United States where these categories are not as unavoidably tied to historical 
conflicts. However, at age 6, children did use ethnicity to make inductive inferences. This 
increase in children’s likelihood to base their inferences on ethnicity is likely what caused 
the gender/ethnicity comparison to become non-significant at age 6, although there was a 
trend for 6-year-olds to pick gender (M = 2.19) more than ethnicity (M = 1.81) on the 
gender/ethnicity trials. Overall, these findings suggest that there is an increase in attention 
to ethnicity with age.  
This pattern of findings was somewhat unexpected, given that previous research 
with children in Israel and Ireland has found that attending integrated schools with higher 
levels of social diversity attenuates children’s tendency to use certain social categories 
when making predictions about others (Deeb et al., 2011; Smyth et al., 2017). Consistent 
with this, frequent positive interactions with out-group members (e.g., members of a 
different race/ethnicity) that are sustained, frequent, and with a cooperative element, 
reduces biased attitudes (Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006). These types of findings in the literature are what led to our prediction that children 
living in a diverse environment may pay less attention to ethnicity when making 
inductive inferences. However, it is possible that our sample was less integrated than we 
thought and that parents and children in the current sample did not have much contact 
with other ethnic groups. A lot of neighborhoods in the US remain racially segregated 
(Orfield, 2001), and even in racially diverse areas, children do not always experience 
friendships with children of different races (Moody, 2001). Perhaps without direct 
contact and sustained relationships with other ethnic groups, living in a diverse context 
does not decrease children’s tendency to use ethnicity to make inductive inferences. 
There is also a conflicting body of findings that find the opposite effect than that 
of the integrated schools in Israel and Ireland.  For instance, White communities with 
higher levels of racial diversity tend to have higher levels of racial bias (Rae, Newheiser, 
& Olson, 2015), and immersive exposure to other-race individuals (i.e., African 
American college students studying in China) does not reduce individuals’ explicit racial 
biases (Qian, Heyman, Quinn, Fu, & Lee, 2017). These findings suggest that mere 
exposure to diverse contexts may not be sufficient to change children’s social-group 
based attitudes. In fact, it could be that living in a diverse environment may afford 
additional opportunities for children to notice implicit cues to bias that might happen in 
cross-group interactions. For instance, Israeli parents that use more generic statements or 
category labels (e.g., “Arabs are like this”) while participating in a storybook task with 
their 5-year-old, have children that are more likely to endorse essentialist beliefs about 
ethnicity (Segall, Birnbaum, Deeb, & Diesendruck, 2015). In other words, these children 
are more likely to form the belief that members of certain ethnic category have inherent, 
stable properties that make individuals in the same ethnic category similar to one another, 
but distinct from members of other categories (Medin & Ortony, 1989). 
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It is also possible that shifts in political discourse relating to ethnicity could have 
potentially impacted the current results. Children in Experiment 4 were run between 
April 2017 and March 2019, during a time where ethnicity-related topics were highlghted 
frequently in the US media and news outlets. This may be a potential subtle 
environmental influence that lead to children’s shift in attention from 5- to 6-years-of 
age.  
In order to fully understand the observed ethnicity pattern in the current study, 
more information is needed in regards to children’s daily experiences with various ethnic 
groups. Specifically, future work should investigate the level of contact children have 
with other ethnicities, the nature of this contact, and the level and extent to which 
children have friendships with children of diverse ethnic backgrounds.   
In summary, the findings from the current study highlight the influence of local 
cultural context on children’s social-category based inferences and expand our 
understanding of children’s use of ethnicity when reasoning about social categories. 
These findings suggest that the relative salience of social categories varies based on 
environmental context. 
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Chapter 5 
 Previous research has found that by preschool, the tendency to assume that 
members of a social category will share inherent, stable characteristics is well 
established. Because this tendency is robust by preschool, it suggests that this tendency 
may emerge earlier. The current dissertation sought to examine the origins of social-
group based inferences in infancy, as well as the role of environmental influences in 
contributing to the development of these inferences across early childhood.  
 In Project 1, we investigated the nature of infants’ social-group based reasoning 
by examining whether infants generalized behavioral dispositions across members of a 
social group. The results of Experiment 1 suggested that 20-month-old infants do not yet 
generalize social dispositions across members of a social group. However, additional 
results suggested that infants might have difficulty reasoning about social dispositions at 
this age. Infants in Experiment 1 expected a single individual to be consistent in 
behaviors when the contexts of the situation remained the same (all her behaviors were in 
a lego-building context). Yet infants in Experiment 2 did not expect an individual to be 
consistent in her behaviors when the context of the situation changed (some behaviors 
were in a lego-building contexts, and some were in a ball-rolling context). Although it is 
possible that infants might generalize across members of a social group with more 
support, as discussed in Project 1, the current study provides no evidence that infants 
generalize behavioral dispositions under the same conditions that infants generalize food 
preferences at this age (Smith & Scott, 2017).  
 Prior research has shown that infants attend to characteristics that mark group 
membership from an early age (e.g., Kelly et al., 2005; Shutts et al., 2009). By the second 
year of life, infants can use a variety of cues to spontaneously categorize individuals into 
social groups (Jin & Baillargeon, 2017; Liberman et al., 2016; Powell & Spelke, 2013). 
Further, some of my own research has shown that at this age, infants generalize some 
properties, such as food preferences, across members of a social group (Smith & Scott, 
2017). Together, these findings suggest that young infants are quite attentive to social 
groups, and are open to the idea that members of a group may be similar to one another in 
terms of their psychological properties. Yet, infants’ failure to generalize behavioral 
dispositions in Project 1 suggests that infants do not necessarily know which properties 
are likely generalizable. This may be something that infants have to learn from their 
environment.  
 Children also have to learn which social groups to essentialize from 
environmental input. The results from Project 1 illustrate that children are not born with 
essentialist beliefs about social categories. Instead, children begin to form essentialist 
beliefs about categories in their environments in order to make sense of the complex 
social world around them. Researchers have proposed that children develop knowledge 
about the social world in a similar manner to how children develop knowledge about the 
biological world (Rhodes & Mandalywala, 2017). Children assume that the world is 
composed of distinct kinds that possess an intrinsic essence that causes members of the 
same kind to share both inherent, unobservable properties as well extrinsic, observable 
properties. When reasoning about biological categories, children typically receive 
consistent information about how to classify different entities (e.g., what makes a dog a 
different animal than a cat).  However, unlike biological categories that are highly stable
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 over time and contexts (Atran, Estin, Coley, & Medin, 1997), social categories are 
highly variable and flexible. People can be categorized in many ways. For instance, a 
person could be categorized by personal characteristics such as race, gender, or social 
status; by psychological characteristics such as preferences, beliefs, goals, and interests; 
and even by completely arbitrary characteristics (Rhodes & Mandalywala, 2017). The 
meanings of these category classifications also vary based on social context and culture. 
Thus, the boundaries of social categories and the differences between particular 
categories are much more ambiguous. Because of this ambiguity, children may receive 
much more inconsistent information about how to structure their social world, and thus 
turn to influences in the environment to help guide their inferences about social 
categories.  
One type of environmental influence that infants may readily learn about social 
categories from is how parents talk about social categories. Project 2 investigated 
whether children could form expectations about a novel social category, Zarpies, after 
their going through a picture book that either had generic or no-label sentences with their 
parent. Children that heard the generic statements in the book expected that a novel 
Zarpie would display similar characteristics to the Zarpie behaviors depicted in the book, 
whereas children that did not hear the generic statements had no expectation about how a 
novel Zarpie would behave. In other words, the manner in which parents discussed the 
social category with their child impacted children’s tendency to essentialize the Zarpie 
category. These findings suggest that parental talk, something that children experience on 
a daily basis, can have profound effects on the categories children attend to, and the 
particular beliefs children form about them.  
In particular, Project 2 highlights the powerful effect of generic statements as a 
mechanism by which children learn about social categories. Although parents may not be 
ostensibly attempting to teach their child something when they use generic statements, 
children’s learning is heavily affected after hearing this type of input. One reason that 
generic statements powerfully affect children’s social-category based inferences and 
judgments is that generics require very little statistical evidence for acceptance (Abelson 
& Kanouse, 1966). For instance, it takes very few instances of a shark attacking 
swimmers for us to make the category-wide generalization that sharks attack people. 
These category-wide generalizations may be an effective way for children to learn about 
biological categories in their environment, but when applied to social categories they can 
have very negative consequences (Leslie, 2017). Further, in Project 2, parents who read 
the generic statements in the book also made more statements that highlighted how 
Zarpie members were a distinct group of people than did parents who did not read the 
generic statements. Thus, hearing the generic statements not only affected the child, but 
also affected the type of language that parents used when discussing the social category.   
These results highlight the importance of generic statements on children’s 
developing beliefs and expectations about social categories. Future research should 
further investigate potential individual differences in the tendency to produce generic 
statements. For instance, in Project 2, parents in both conditions produced relatively low 
instances of generic, comparative, and contrastive statements. However, this was a brief 
session of parent-child interaction that typically lasted around 5- to 15-minutes. It is 
possible that with more representative sample, or more instances of how parents discuss 
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social groups with their children, we would see clearer effects of these types of 
statements on children’s formation of beliefs about social categories. This would allow us 
to further investigate potential individual and group differences in how parents discuss 
social categories, as the potential downstream effects on children’s learning.  
 Children must also learn which social categories to attend to when making 
inductive inferences. As previously mentioned, because the boundaries of social 
categories are flexible, people can be categorized in many ways. Adding to this 
complexity, people can simultaneously be members of multiple social categories. For 
instance, a person can be an athlete and a political activist, or a female and a scientist. 
Children’s learning about which social categories to attend to is likely impacted by 
children’s environment in several ways. For instance, the relative salience of particular 
social categories varies across cultures. In cultures where social categories are tied to 
historical conflicts, children may find these categories especially salient, and use them to 
guide their inferences when make inductive inferences. In Project 3, children in the US 
were much less likely to attend to religion categories than children in Northern Ireland, 
where religion categories have been shown to be especially salient in the environment. 
These results suggest that the relative salience of particular social categories in the 
environment affects the social categories that children attend to in their environment 
when making inductive inferences.   
Similarly, we found that 5-year-olds in the US are less likely to make inferences 
based on ethnicity than children in Israel. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that 
children’s tendency to base their inferences on ethnicity increased from age 5 to age 6. 
Because the children in our study were drawn from a highly diverse area, we expected 
that children in our study would be less likely to attend to ethnicity based on prior 
research that found that diverse contexts attenuate children’s tendency to use particular 
social categories (e.g., Deeb et al., 2011; Smyth et al., 2017).  Yet, it turns out diversity 
may have more complex effects than we previously thought. A recent meta-analysis 
conducted on the relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust found mixed 
effects: approximately half of the studies reviewed found a significant negative 
relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust, whereas the other half of the studies 
reviewed did not (Schaeffer, 2014). This suggests that the relationship between diversity 
and group-based relationships and reasoning is not straightforward. Conflict theory, 
proposed by Allport (1954), predicts that mere exposure to groups with different ethnic 
backgrounds can cause out-group prejudice and in-group favoritism (Bobo & Hutchins, 
1996; Quillan, 1995). If children do not have sustained, meaningful interactions with 
individuals of other ethnicities, it is possible that ethnicity becomes a salient dimension to 
children. In fact, several studies found that when individuals have meaningful contact 
with diverse ethnic groups, the impact of diversity on social trust becomes less negative 
(Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Further, some have 
argued that people may live in a broader diverse context (e.g., California) while 
simultaneously live in a rather homogenous local environmental context (Uslaner, 2012). 
In these contexts, there may not be as many opportunities to interact with individuals of 
other backgrounds, which has been found to reduce biased attitudes (Allport, 1954; 
Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Overall, these findings suggest the 
impact of diversity on children’s tendency to use ethnic categories when reasoning about 
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others is highly complex. More research is needed on the amount of contact children have 
with individuals of other ethnicities, as well as the nature of these interactions in order to 
clarify this complex relationship between diversity and children’s tendency to use 
categories based on ethnicity when reasoning about others. 
Although children may readily attend to social groups from early on in life, input 
from the environment influences the types of characteristics children generalize across 
social groups and the particular social groups children attend to in the environment. 
However, the biases that children form about social groups are not inevitable, as shown 
by Project 2 and in Project 3. In Project 2, children that did not hear the generic 
statements did not believe that Zarpies members would behave similarly. This provides 
us with a potential avenue for diminishing the potential negative downstream effects of 
essentialist thinking by changing the way we talk about social categories. Project 3 
demonstrated that children do not have strong beliefs about religion at either age point we 
tested. These findings suggest that children are not born with biases about social 
categories. Children must be learning these biases, and they only learn them under 
particular kinds of environmental conditions. Thus, forming categories and using them to 
inform our inferences does not always have negative effects. On the contrary, 
categorization is a fundamental piece of human cognition that is extremely important and 
valuable. To summarize, it is clear that categorization does not inevitably lead to these 
biases. Biases happen under particular conditions, and the studies investigated here 
provide a first step for knowing what these conditions are.  
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Appendix A: Essentialist Belief-inducing Paragraph Used in Experiment 3  
 
“Imagine that some scientists went to a far- away place and they discovered some people 
living there. These were people that the scientists had never studied before, so the 
scientists studied the people in detail. They looked at all of their biological features—
their DNA and their blood types—and at their cultural practices. They discovered that the 
population was very different from any community that scientists had ever studied 
before. They had very different/ biological properties, and very different cultural 
practices, from any people that the scientists had ever studied. The scientists had 
discovered Zarpies!” 
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Appendix B: Vocabulary Checklist Used in Experiment 4 
Child’s Name: ______________ 
 
 
Child’s Birthdate: ______________ 
 
 
Parent filling out this form: ______________ 
 
 
Please indicate whether your child understands the following 
words: 
 
   
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Protestan
t 
Catholic 
Christian 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Hispanic 
 
Latino 
 
Mexican 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
White
  
Jewish Yes No 
Yes No 
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Appendix C: Novel Properties Used in Experiment 4 
 
Category Properties 
Preferences Likes to play a game called gorp/zool 
 Likes to pim/nade with his/her friend 
 Likes to read books about neem/glip 
 
Beliefs Believes that feps/wugs live in trees 
 Thinks it is important to be framish/blickish 
 Thinks that daxes eat quibs/rabs 
 
Biology Has blood type zid/seb 
 Has lindon/kiron in his/her stomach 
 Has zorbs/flarns inside of him/her 
 
Future occupation aspirations Wants to be a zagor/dunkel when s/he grows up 
 Wants to be ludine/zaber s/he grows up 
 Plans to be a jeckiff/naggle in the future 
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Table 1 
Text Used in the Picture-book Task (Experiment 3) 
Page Generic No label 
1 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies love to eat 
flowers 
Look at this! This one loves to eat 
flowers. 
2 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies have stripes 
in their hair. 
Look at this! This one has stripes in her 
hair. 
 3 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies can bounce 
a ball on their heads. 
Look at this! This one can bounce a ball 
on his head. 
4 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies like to sing. 
 
Look at this! This one likes to sing.  
 
5 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies climb tall 
fences.  
 
Look at this! This one climbs tall fences.  
 
6 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies flap their 
arms when they are happy.  
 
Look at this! This one flaps her arms 
when she is happy.  
 7 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies have 
freckles on their feet.  
Look at this! This one has freckles on his 
feet.  
 8 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies hop over 
puddles.  
Look at this! This one hops over puddles.  
 
9 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies hate walking 
in the mud.  
 
Look at this! This one hates walking in 
the mud.  
 10 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies draw stars 
on their knees.  
 
Look at this! This one draws stars on her 
knees.  
 11 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies can flip in 
the air.  
 
Look at this! This one can flip in the air.  
 
12 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies are scared of 
ladybugs.  
 
Look at this! This one is scared of 
ladybugs.  
 13 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies hate ice 
cream.  
Look at this! This one hates ice cream.  
14 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies chase 
shadows.  
 
Look at this! This one chases shadows.  
 
15 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpie babies are 
wrapped in orange blankets.  
 
Look at this! This one baby is wrapped 
in an orange blanket.  
 16 Look at this Zarpie! Zarpies sleep in tall 
trees.  
 
Look at this! This one sleeps in tall trees.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Parental Talk in Experiment 3, Separately by Picture-book 
Condition in Experiment 3 
 Generic Condition 
 
Mean (SD) 
No-label Condition 
 
Mean (SD) 
Percentage of Statements 
Ball talk 6.50 (2.16) 
 
5.94 (1.42) 
Ice cream talk 7.24 (2.50) 7.20 (1.71) 
Flap/spin talk 6.16 (2.17) 5.98 (1.79) 
Generic statements 1.49 (1.89) 0.24 (1.02) 
Comparative statements 1.90 (1.90) 0.85 (1.26) 
Contrastive statements 2.36 (3.23) 1.15 (1.81) 
Number of Statements   
Ball talk 7.47 (4.70) 5.97 (2.77) 
Ice cream talk 7.81 (3.64) 7.42 (3.97) 
Flap/spin talk 6.44 (2.51) 6.10 (3.48) 
Generic statements 1.66 (2.19) 0.19 (0.65) 
Comparative statements 2.03 (1.93) 0.87 (1.36) 
Contrastive statements 2.78 (3.92) 1.03 (1.64) 
Total number of utterances 110.22 (41.18) 101.87 (46.37) 
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Table 3 
The Number of Children in Experiment 4 Who Selected a Particular Social Category on 
All Four Trials, Three Trials, Two Trials, One Trial, or None of the Trials, Separately by 
Triad Type and Age Group.  
Gender vs. Ethnicity Trials 
  5-year-olds  6-year-olds  Overall 
  Gender Ethnicity  Gender Ethnicity  Gender Ethnicity 
Number of 
selections 
        
0 1 6  2 1  3 7 
1 7 9  4 12  11 21 
2 9 9  13 13  22 22 
3 9 7  12 4  21 11 
4 6 1  1 2  7 3 
 
Gender vs. Religion Trials 
  5-year-olds  6-year-olds  Overall 
  Gender Religion  Gender Religion  Gender Religion 
Number of 
selections 
        
0 1 7  1 3  2 10 
1 6 8  7 10  13 18 
2 10 10  11 11  21 21 
3 8 6  10 7  18 13 
4 7 1  3 1  10 2 
         
Ethnicity vs. Religion Trials 
 5-year-olds  6-year-olds  Overall 
 Ethnicity Religion  Ethnicity Religion  Ethnicity Religion 
Number of 
selections 
        
0 3 2  1 6  4 8 
1 8 9  3 10  11 19 
2 10 10  12 12  22 22 
3 9 8  10 3  19 11 
4 2 3  6 1  8 4 
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Figure 1. Group-induction trial from Experiment 1.   
Fep-A Fep-B Rab-A 
Hi,	I’m	a	Fep! Hi,	I’m	a	Fep	too! Hi,	I’m	a	Rab! 
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Prosocial Familiarization Trial 1
Antisocial Familiarization Trial 1
Fep-A Neutral Agent 
Figure 2. Sample prosocial and antisocial familiarization trials from Experiment 1. 
Infants viewed either three prosocial familiarization trials or three antisocial 
familiarization trials.  
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Figure 3. Prosocial and antisocial test events from same-agent condition of Experiment 1. 
 
  
Test Trial 
Prosocial Event 
Antisocial Event 
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Figure 4. Infants’ mean looking time (in seconds) to the inconsistent and consistent test 
events in the same-agent and different-agent conditions of Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
Condition
M
ea
n 
loo
kin
g 
tim
e 
(s
)
Event
Inconsistent
Consistent
Same-agent Different-agent 
M
ea
n 
lo
ok
in
g 
tim
e 
(s
) 
Test Event 
Inconsis ent 
Consis ent 
*	
   
59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Prosocial and antisocial test events from Experiment 2.   
Test Trial 
Prosocial Event 
Antisocial Event 
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Figure 6. Sample pages from the picture-book task in Experiment 3. 
  
Look	at	this	Zarpie!	Zarpies	can	bounce	a	ball	on	their	heads. 
Look	at	this	Zarpie!	Zarpies	hate	ice	cream. 
Look	at	this	Zarpie!	Zarpies	flap	their	arms	when	they	are	happy. 
Page 3 
Page 6 
Page 13 
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Figure 7. Test events shown in the video task of Experiment 3. Children saw pairs of 
events in which a person dressed as a Zarpie displayed behaviors that were either 
consistent, or inconsistent with the Zarpie behaviors depicted in the book (order 
counterbalanced).  
  
Zarpie-consistent  
Events 
Zarpie-inconsistent 
 Events 
Test Pair 1 
Test	Pair	2 
Test	Pair	3 
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Figure 8. Children’s difference scores for the ball, ice cream, and flap/spin items in the 
video task, as well as children’s overall difference score for both the generic and no-label 
picture-book sentences in Experiment 3.   
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Figure 9. Example of a religion/gender trial from Experiment 4.  
This child is Jewish. He is a boy. This 
Jewish boy likes to play a game called 
Gorp.  
This child is Christian. She is a girl. This 
Christian girl likes to play game called 
Zool. 
Look at this child. She is Jewish like this child. She is a 
girl like this child. Does she like to play a game called 
Gorp like him? Or does she like to play a game called Zool 
like her? 
